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ABSTRACT
An Analysis of the Differential Power o f the Fake Bad Scale o f the MMPI-2
by
Nicole A. Cavenagh, M.A.
Dr. Douglas Ferraro, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Psychology 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This study examined the ability of the Fake Bad Scale of the Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 to differentiate among individuals who have a 
traumatic brain injury, individuals with a somatoform disorder, and individuals who are 
malingering. Participants were chosen from a pool o f 283 personal injury and workers 
compensation cases obtained from an established neuropsychological practice in a major 
Southwestern city. Each of these participants was involved in litigation and received a 
diagnosis that included traumatic brain injury, a somatoform disorder, or malingering. 
Complete neuropsychological and psychological test batteries were conducted on each 
participant, and the complete medical records for each participant were reviewed. Of the 
available cases 30 individuals with a diagnosis of malingering, 31 individuals with a 
diagnosis o f  a somatoform disorder, and 21 individuals with a traumatic brain injury were 
selected for analysis.
The first aspect of the Fake Bad Scale that was examined was its ability to 
differentiate among individuals with traumatic brain injury, a somatoform disorder, or
111
who are malingering. These data were analyzed utilizing a one-way Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA). The ANOVA indicated that the mean Fake Bad Scale scores for 
each group were significantly different; thus, a Bonferroni comparison was made. This 
comparison demonstrated that the Fake Bad Scale significantly differentiated between 
each possible pairwise comparison of the three groups of interest in terms of mean score. 
The sensitivity and specificity of the Fake Bad Scale were also examined and indicated 
that significantly different mean scores did not necessarily imply accuracy of 
classification given that the Fake Bad Scale correctly classified individuals with 
Somatoform Disorder less than 50 percent of the time.
Next, the Fake Bad Scale of the MMPI-2 was compared to other validity 
measures of the MMPI-2 by using a separate one-way ANOVA for each validity scale of 
interest These analyses indicated that the F Scale, the F-K Index, and the F(b) Scale each 
produced significantly different mean scores for the three groups of interest. Subsequent 
Bonferroni comparisons indicated that none of these scales significantly differentiated 
between malingerers and individuals with a traumatic brain injury. The sensitivity and 
specificity for each MMPI-2 validity scale were also considered, and resulted in the 
conclusion that the F(b) Scale provided the most consistent classification of each 
diagnostic group.
The final question that was considered was whether there were gender 
differences in the ability of the Fake Bad Scale to differentiate among the three groups of 
interest. These data were analyzed using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). Gender 
differences on the Fake Bad Scale were not found.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The diagnosis of malingering, or the feigning of medical or psychological symptoms, 
has been a much debated topic in the field of neuropsychology for many years. This is 
primarily because there is no hard and fast rule regarding what is the best method for 
detecting and definitively diagnosing malingering. While nearly any psychological or 
medical disorder can be malingered, the disorder of interest in this research is traumatic 
brain injury.
Accurate assessments of traumatic brain injury, and the malingering of traumatic 
brain injury, are both important and problematic. They are important because head 
injuries are the inost common acute neurological disorder in the United States (Kraus & 
Sorenson, 1994), and because litigation in head injury cases can often result in 
settlements that run into the millions of dollars. Thus, there is high motivation for people 
to malinger head injuries. The assessment of head injury malingering can be very 
problematic due to the fact that there is no “gold-standard” for measures of head injury 
malingering, and most of these malingering measures have been developed using normal 
participants who are instructed to feign a head injury (e.g. Reitan & Wolfson, 2002). The 
problems with this research methodology are fully articulated in the literature review 
which follows (cf. Chapter II).
In addition to being important and problematic, accurate assessment of head injury and its 
malingering is difficult. One reason for this difficulty is that frequently there are not 
accurate records of an individual’s prior level of functioning (e.g., people rarely have had 
prior I.Q. tests to determine cognitive functioning), which are often an important part of 
detecting malingering. Another reason for the difficulty in determining malingering of 
traumatic brain injury is the fact that on occasion the medical records do not coincide 
with the expressed symptomology, as would be the case in a somatization disorder, which 
is distinctly different from malingering (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). 
However, the primary assessment problem in the area of traumatic head injury is that of 
differential diagnosis; that is, being able to differentiate among individuals who are 
actually experiencing symptoms related to traumatic brain injury and have medical test 
results that support the diagnosis of traumatic brain injury, individuals who have a 
somatization disorder of some type, and individuals who are, in fact, feigning their 
symptoms.
There are many possible measures that can be used to assess malingering as are 
reviewed subsequently in Chapter II However, one measure that is the focal point of this 
research, and that is commonly used in the detection of malingering, is the Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory -  2 (MMPI-2; Butcher, Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, 
& Kaemmer, 1989). The MMPI-2 consists of ten clinical scales and nine validity scales 
(Graham, 2000). There are several other validity indicators on the MMPI-2 as well, one 
of which is particularly important in the detection of malingering, namely the Fake Bad 
Scale (FBS; Lees-Haley, English, & Glenn, 1991).
The Fake Bad Scale (FBS) was specifically developed as a means to detect 
malingering among personal injury litigants (Lees-Haley, English, & Glenn, 1991). There 
has been substantial research on the ability of the FBS to detect malingering among 
personal injury litigants, which has led to mixed results. For example, while Larrabee 
(1998) found that elevations on the FBS, combined with elevations on the 
Hypochondriasis and Hysteria elinical scales of the MMPI-2, were indicative of 
malingering, other researchers have found that the FBS is more likely to assess general 
maladjustment and somatic complaints rather than malingering per se (e.g. Butcher, 
Arbisis, Atlis, & McNulty, 2003). Another study has found that the FBS may be superior 
at detecting malingering in applied forensic settings but not in more general settings 
where litigation is not involved (Greiffenstein, Baker, Axelrod, Gervais, & Peck, 2004).
Inasmuch as the detection and differential diagnosis of malingering is o f considerable 
importance, particularly where litigation is involved, and inasmuch as the FBS has been 
shown to be inconsistent in its diagnostic efficacy, perhaps due to the various assessment 
contexts in which it has been used, it seems appropriate further to investigate the efficacy 
of the FBS in detecting malingering and to do so to assess personal injury litigants , 
whieh is the population for whom the FBS was originally designed.
It is the overarching goal of the present research to utilize data fi-om purported head 
injury patients to ascertain the effieacy of the MMPI-2 Fake Bad Scale in assessing 
malingering and in differentiating bona fide head injury patients from those with 
somatization disorder or who were malingering. Essentially, the present research intends 
to further examine the validity of the Fake Bad Scale in terms of its differential
diagnostic ability among individuals who are malingering, those with a somatoform 
disorder, and those who have incurred a traumatic brain injury.
In general, prior research has shown that many individuals who malinger are likely to 
portray physical rather than cognitive symptoms (Aubrey, Dobbs, & Rule, 1989;
Gouvier, Presholdt, & Warner, 1988; Wilier, Johnson, Rempel, & Linn, 1993). However, 
this is not necessarily consistent with the known sequelae of traumatic brain injury. For 
example, after a mild brain injury, most people will complain of decreased concentration, 
memory deficits, headaches, and dizziness (Bigler & Clement, 1997). As brain injuries 
increase in severity from moderate to very severe or profound, these same sequelae are 
seen with the addition of posttraumatic amnesia, contusions and shearing damage, some 
degree of permanent neurological deficit, and, in the most severe cases, a persistent 
vegetative state (Bigler & Clement, 1997). There has been significant controversy 
regarding the duration of these sequelae, particularly postconcussion syndrome in mild 
head injury cases where there is litigation (Rutherford, 1989; Fisher, 1982; Ewing, 
McCarthy, Groenwall, & Wrightson, 1980).
Somatoform disorders differ significantly from traumatic brain injuries in their 
associated symptomology. These disorders are critical to consider in the differential 
diagnosis of malingering versus traumatic brain injury, particularly given that, as stated 
above, many who malinger make physical complaints (Aubrey, Dobbs, & Rule, 1989; 
Gouvier, Presholdt, & Warner, 1988; Wilier, Johnson, Rempel, & Linn, 1993). In 
general, unlike the sequelae typically associated with traumatic brain injury, the defining 
characteristic of a somatoform disorder is a complaint of physical pain. Typically, these 
complaints are not fully explained by, or are in excess of what would be accepted due to.
a general medical condition or the direct effects of a substance. Furthermore, these 
complaints are not intentionally produced or feigned.
Toward that end, in the subsequent pages a description of traumatic brain injury and 
its sequelae will be presented followed by a discussion of somatization disorders. Next, 
alternative methods of assessing malingering among potential head injury patients will be 
reviewed, followed by an in depth discussion of the MMPI-2 as a tool for diagnosing 
malingering. Lastly, the Fake Bad Scale, the F Scale, the F-K Index, and the F(b) Scale 
of the MMPI-2 will be reviewed and analyzed for their ability to differentiate among 
head injury, somatoform and malingering patient groups. The Fake Bad Scale consists of 
several items from the Hypochondriasis and Hysteria Clinical Scales of the MMPI-2 
(Larrabee, 1003b). The items on these scales tend to involve illness, disease, and 
physical complaints (Groth-Mamat, 1999). As described above, physical complaints may 
not play as large of a role in the diagnosis o f traumatic brain injury as in the diagnosis of 
a somatoform disorder or malingering. More simply, physical complaints may not be as 
consistent with the sequelae of traumatic brain injury as they are with both somatoform 
disorders and malingering. The other MMPI-2 validity scales have all been examined by 
previous research and have demonstrated sensitivity to overreporting of symptoms; there 
is, in fact, significant empirical literature on the faking of head injury symptoms on the 
MMPI and the MMPI-2 (e.g.. Butcher, Arbisi, Atlis, & McNulty, 2003; Greiffenstein et 
al., 2004; Larrabee, 1998; Berry & Butcher, 1998). Furthermore, analog studies have 
suggested that those who are faking and/or potentially exaggerating symptoms of head 
injury tend to show elevated MMPI-2 overreporting symptom scales (Berry & Butcher, 
1998).
As will emerge from this literature review, the present research was designed more 
specifically to address the following hypotheses:
1. It is hypothesized that the Fake Bad Scale will successfully differentiate between 
individuals with a traumatic brain injuiy and individuals who are malingering and 
between individuals with a traumatic brain injuiy and those with a somatoform 
disorder, but that the Fake Bad Scale will be less successful at differentiating 
between individuals who are malingering and those with a somatoform disorder.
2. It was further hypothesized that the Fake Bad Scale would be comparable to other 
MMPI-2 validity scales as well as to the Portland Digit Recognition Test and the 
Test of Memory Malingering when differentiating between traumatic brain 
injuries and somatoform disorders as well as between traumatic brain injury and 
malingering, but that the Fake Bad Scale would be less successful than other 
MMPI-2 validity scales and the above mentioned malingering measures when 
differentiating between somatoform disorders and malingering
3. The final hypothesis is that there would not be gender differences in how well the 
Fake Bad Scale differentiates between individuals with traumatic brain injury, 
individuals with somatoform disorders, and individuals who are malingering.
CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Head Injury
Head injury is the most common acute neurological disorder in the United States, and 
head injuries vary considerably in their severity (Kraus & Sorenson, 1994). Over nine 
million new cases of traumatic brain injury are reported each year (Gouvier, Hayes, & 
Smiroldo, 1998), with males aged 16 to 25 years being most at risk (Sorenson & Kraus, 
1991). It is estimated that over two million of these cases suffer some degree of 
permanent, measurable cerebral damage from the head injury (Goldstein, 1990). Two 
types of head injuries can lead to traumatic brain injuries. A closed head injury (CHI) 
occurs when the skull remains intact after the injury, such as when a skull fracture occurs. 
Closed head injuries usually occur during motor vehicle accidents, falls, and blows to the 
head. With this type of injury there is a greater likelihood of more generalized cerebral 
damage (Bigler & Clement, 1997). Penetrating head injuries (PHI) occur when the skull 
is perforated or penetrated, such as from a bullet wound. With PHI there is a greater 
likelihood of focal brain damage.
Traumatic brain injury can be divided into four categories of severity. Mild brain injury 
is characterized by the individual experiencing transient loss of, or alteration in, 
consciousness that lasts for no longer than 60 minutes (Bigler & Clement, 1997). There 
is a rapid return to the previous level of consciousness. Posttraumatic symptoms of mild
brain injuries include headache, dizziness, poor concentration, and poor memory. Some 
data (Wrightson, 1989; Ewing, McCarthy, Groenwall, & Wrightson, 1980) indicated that 
there is the potential for permanent damage even with a mild brain injury. Moderate 
brain injuries typically involve an alteration in consciousness that lasts for more than 60 
minutes. In this instance, the potential for a good recovery depends upon whether or not 
an individual’s critical systems were involved. Moderate brain injury has the same 
posttraumatic symptoms as a mild brain injury, but may also involve posttraumatic 
amnesia. Posttraumatic amnesia is the period of time from the trauma to the return of 
consistent memory function; if there is a loss of consciousness posttraumatic amnesia 
begins when consciousness is regained (Bigler & Clement, 1997). The next level for 
brain injuries is a severe brain injury. In the case of a severe brain injury the individual is 
immediately incapacitated in terms of his or her ability to follow simple instructions. The 
individual may be fully comatose. Motor deficits and pathological reflexes are present. 
With severe brain injuries, posttraumatic amnesia usually lasts from one to seven days, 
but can last even longer. Brain contusions and shearing damage to white matter are 
common with these injuries, and some degree of permanent neurological deficit usually 
persists (Bigler & Clement, 1997). The final, and most severe, category is very 
severe/profound brain injury. With this level of injury the individual is unconscious and 
unresponsive immediately or shortly after the injury. The individual is unable to 
communicate and cannot follow simple instructions. Many who suffer profound brain 
injuries die within a few minutes of the injury. If the individual survives, a persistent 
vegetative state is common; higher cortical functioning is not recovered (Bigler & 
Clement, 1997).
Traumatic brain injury is measured using the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS). This scale 
is used to evaluate the severity of impairment of function in the very early stages of a 
traumatic brain injury (Bigler & Clement, 1997). The Glasgow Coma Scale is a 15-point 
scale that measures functioning in terms of: eye opening, from no eye opening even in 
response to pain to spontaneous eye opening; motor response, from inability to move to 
ability to follow simple instructions; and verbal response, from no response to normal 
orientation to person, place, and time (Teasdale and Jennett, 1976, 1974). Scores range 
from 3 to 15, with lower scores indicating poorer functioning. Glasgow Coma Scale 
scores of 8 and lower are associated with severe head injury, scores between 9 and 12 
with moderate head injury, and scores between 13 and 15 with mild head injury.
There are many factors involved in a traumatic brain injury. The first is the impact of 
the injury itself. The impact of the injury can range from a simple bump on the head to a 
skull fracture or penetrating head injury, with the risk for traumatic brain injury 
increasing with the impact of the injury. There are also clearly identified signs and 
symptoms associated with traumatic brain injuries. The presence or absence of a 
subdural hematoma also is a factor in traumatic brain injury. Approximately 30 percent 
of individuals who suffer a severe closed head injury will develop subdural hematomas 
(Genarelli, 1990). Those who develop subdural hematomas suffer greater cerebral 
atrophy, especially in frontal regions, and greater ventricular dilation (Cullum & Bigler, 
1985). Additionally, these individuals perform more poorly on neuropsychological 
measures, especially memory tests, than those who had closed head injuries but did not 
develop a subdural hematoma (Cullum & Bigler, 1986). Acute subdural hematomas are 
associated with a mortality rate of above 60 percent (Eisenberg & Weiner, 1987). A third
factor in traumatic brain injury is increasèd intracranial pressure. This can cause damage 
to brain tissue, and, in very severe cases, herniation of the medulla through the foramen 
magnum (Bigler & Clement, 1997). Increased intracranial pressure can be caused by 
hemorrhaging that leads to a hematoma and by cerebral edema that causes brain swelling. 
Anoxia, or insufficient oxygen to the brain, results in severe neuronal damage very 
quickly and can produce devastating and widespread effects on the brain. Whether or not 
anoxia occurs is an important factor in traumatic brain injury.
Posttraumatic degenerative changes can also impact traumatic brain injured 
individuals. Over the course of time after a traumatic brain injury, axons that were 
injured at the time of impact will degenerate. This results in the diffuse wasting of key 
white matter tracts. For example, if this occurs in the ventricles, the result can be 
ventricular system dilation (Bigler & Clement, 1997). Several studies have indicated that 
this occurrence is one of the most sensitive indicators of pathological central nervous 
system changes (Bigler, 1990; Johnson, Bigler, Burr, & Blatter, 1994; Cullum & Bigler, 
1996; Levi, Guilburd, Lemberger, Soustiel, & Feinsod, 1990; Massman, Bigler, Cullum, 
& Naugle, 1986). Related to posttraumatic degenerative changes is another factor in 
traumatic brain injury, hydrocephalus. When brain tissue degenerates cerebrospinal fluid 
expands to fill the space, resulting in hydrocephalus ex vacuo (Bigler & Clement, 1997). 
After a traumatic brain injury, other types of hydrocephalus may develop, including an 
impaired flow of cerebrospinal fluid and normal pressure hydrocephalus (Fishman, 1978; 
Jennett & Teasdale, 1981). Other factors related to traumatic brain injury include 
posttraumatic epilepsy, which affects between 5 and 30 percent of those who suffer head 
injuries, and cranial nerve damage (Bigler & Clement, 1997).
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Sequelae of Traumatic Brain Injury
Other aspects of traumatic brain injury that must be considered in the diagnostic 
process are the neuropsychological sequelae of moderate and severe head injuries, 
including cognitive, emotional, and executive functioning, postconcussion syndrome, and 
cognitive rehabilitation. These are critical factors because they can provide significant 
insight into the individual’s current level of functioning, which then can be compared to 
the individual’s prior level of functioning in order to determine the severity of decline 
since the injury. In the case of cognitive sequelae, neuropsychologists must determine 
the length of the loss of consciousness as well as the length of posttraumatic amnesia. In 
general, the longer the length of the posttraumatic amnesia, the greater is the likelihood 
that the individual will have lasting cognitive deficit and failure to return to his or her 
pre-injury level o f employment (Paniak, Shore, Rourke, Finlayson, & Mostacalis, 1992). 
Individuals with moderate to severe closed head injuries typically have difficulty with 
most measures of cognitive fimctioning. As early as 1942, Goldstein indicated that 
patients with diffuse damage, like what is suffered with a moderate to severe closed head 
injury, generally have deficits in speed of performance and sustained attention along with 
most other measures of cognitive functioning. Another key area of deficit that must be 
evaluated in head-injured individuals is memory. Significant memory deficits are 
common in those who have suffered a traumatic brain injury, and these individuals 
should be assessed for both retrograde and anterograde memory deficits.
Emotional and executive functioning must also be considered in terms of level of 
functioning both pre- and post-injury when assessing patients who have suffered a 
moderate to severe closed head injury. However, many of the commonly used measures
II
of emotional disturbance are not appropriate for individuals with a traumatic brain injury. 
For example, when given the MMPI, traumatic brain injured populations typically have 
elevated scores on Scales 2 (Depression), 8 (Schizophrenia), 1 (Hypochondriasis), 3 
(Hysteria), and 7 (Psychasthenia; Leininger, Kreutzer, & Hill, 1991; Alfano, Neilson, 
Panniak, & Finlayson, 1992). Additionally, Gass and Russell (1991) further examined 
this population’s performance and found that on the Depression scale most complaints 
were of mental dullness and physical problems. Gass and Russell (1991) also found that 
on other elevated scales the primary complaints were of a physical or cognitive nature. 
So, while it is important to assess for emotional distress and personality changes in those 
who have suffered traumatic brain injury, clinicians must be aware that elevations on 
commonly used measures may be more indicative of cognitive and physical, rather than 
affective, complaints. According to Jennett and Teasdale (1981), there are three primary 
areas of personality change that should be assessed in individuals with a moderate to 
severe head injury. These are drive, affective change, and deficits in executive 
functioning. With regard to drive, these individuals typically experience diminished 
drive, with the patient lacking initiative and having diminished motivation and interest. 
Affective changes are also common, with emotional lability being a frequent complaint. 
Lastly, deficits in executive functioning, such as judgment and social restraint, often 
result in impulsivity, a lower frustration tolerance, and an impaired sense of what is 
socially acceptable. Smaller subsets of those with traumatic brain injuries develop more 
significant psychological disorders, such as major depression, mania, bipolar disorder, 
and schizophrenia-like symptoms (Fedoroff et al, 1992; Jorge et al., 1993; Zwil, 
McAllister, Cohen, & Halpem, 1993; Buckley et al., 1993).
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Postconcussion syndrome is a third important factor in head injury cases. After 
sustaining a head injury, particularly a mild head injury, most people complain of 
headache, dizziness, poor concentration, poor memory, fatigue, and increased irritability 
(Bigler & Clement, 1997). There is significant controversy regarding ho^v long these 
symptoms may persist, especially in litigation cases. Hov^ever, some studies do indicate 
that even very mild head injuries can result in significant damage (Rutherford, 1989; 
Fisher, 1982; Ewing, McCarthy, Groenwall, & Wrightson, 1980).
After considering each of these factors in cases o f traumatic brain injury, the next step 
in the diagnostic process is to determine the potential for cognitive rehabilitation. This 
aspect can have special importance in head injury litigation in terms of the amount of 
compensation that occurs for lifetime care. There is a clearly identified 
neuropsychological progression of recovery (Gouvier, Hayes, & Smiroldo, 1998).
Several studies indicate that it is possible for significant rehabilitation of cognitive 
functioning to occur in individuals who have suffered traumatic brain injuries (Goldstein 
& Oakley, 1985; Incagnoli & Newman, 1985; Prigatano, 1986; Franzen & Harris, 1993). 
Despite the fact that some deficits will be permanent, especially when significant 
structural abnormalities are present, areas of strength and/or intact functioning can be 
used as a basis for the individual to adapt to or compensate for the deficit (Prigatano, 
1986; Sbordone, 1984).
Once the nature and symptomology of traumatic brain injury are understood, it 
follows that symptoms of other disorders, that may resemble traumatic brain injury, must 
also be considered in order to be sure an accurate differential diagnosis is made. This is 
especially important in litigation cases where a differentiation must be made between
13
traumatic brain injury, a psychological disorder such as somatization disorder, and 
malingering. Along these lines, the Somatoform Disorders must be carefully defined so 
that an appropriate diagnosis can be made. The Somatoform Disorders are relevant in 
differentiating true head injury from malingering because many individuals who malinger 
are likely to portray physical rather than cognitive symptoms (Aubrey, Dobbs, & Rule, 
1989; Gouvier, Presholdt, & Warner, 1988; Wilier, Johnson, Rempel, & Linn, 1993)
Somatization Disorders 
Somatization Disorder, historically known as hysteria or Briquet’s syndrome, is a 
multisymptomatic disorder (APA, 2000). This disorder typically begins before the age of 
30 and often lasts for many years. It is characterized by pain of a gastrointestinal, sexual, 
and/or pseudoneurological nature that is unsubstantiated by lab results. Individuals with 
somatization disorder usually describe their complaints in colorful, exaggerated ways but 
often lack specific factual information. Additionally, there are often inconsistencies in 
the history of complaints, and these individuals often seek treatment from multiple 
physicians at the same time. Anxious and depressive symptoms are common as are 
impulsive and/or antisocial behaviors, suicide threats and/or attempts, and marital 
discord. Somatization Disorder affects between .2% and 2% of women and less than .2% 
of men (APA, 2000). The DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) criteria for somatization disorder 
include the following:
• History of many physical complaints beginning before 30 years of age that 
occur over several years and result in treatment seeking behaviors or
14
significant impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of 
function
• Four Pain Symptoms: history of pain in at least four different areas or 
functions, e.g., head, back, joints, abdomen, extremities, chest, rectum, 
during menstruation, sexual intercourse, or urination
• Two Gastrointestinal Symptoms: other than pain, e.g., nausea, bloating, 
vomiting, etc.
• One Sexual Symptom: other than pain, e.g., sexual indifference, erectile 
dysfunction, irregular menses
• One Pseudoneurological Symptom: suggesting a neurological condition 
not limited to pain, e.g., conversion symptoms, paralysis or localized 
weakness, hallucinations, loss of touch or pain sensation, double vision, 
amnesia, etc.
• Either of these:
o After appropriate examination, each of the above symptoms cannot 
be fully explained by a known general medical condition or by the 
direct effects of a substance 
o When there is a related medical condition, the complaints are in 
excess of what would be expected
• Symptoms are not intentionally produced or feigned; not malingering 
The final DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) criterion for somatization disorder is what clearly 
separates it from a diagnosis of malingering. The remaining criteria, particularly the lack
15
of medical findings to support complaints, separate somatization disorder from traumatic 
brain injury.
A second disorder that falls under the umbrella of Somatoform Disorders is 
Undifferentiated Somatoform Disorder. This disorder is characterized by unexplained 
physical complaints for at least six months that do not meet criteria for Somatization 
Disorder and by an unpredictable course. Young women of low socioeconomic status are 
most frequently afflicted, but the disorder is not limited to one gender, age, or 
sociocultural group. The DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) criteria for Undifferentiated 
Somatoform Disorder are:
• One or more physical complaints: fatigue, loss of appetite, gastrointestinal, or 
urinary complaints
• Either of these:
o After appropriate examination, each of the above symptoms cannot be 
fully explained by a known general medical condition or by the direct 
effects of a substance 
o When there is a related medical condition, the complaints are in excess of 
what would be expected
• Symptoms cause clinically significant distress or impairment in various functions
• Symptoms last for at least six months
• Symptoms are not better accounted for by another mental disorder
• Symptoms are not intentionally produced or feigned; not malingering 
Like Somatization Disorder, Undifferentiated Somatoform Disorder is clearly 
differentiated from both traumatic brain injury and malingering.
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Conversion Disorder consists of unexplained symptoms or deficits that affect 
voluntary motor or sensory function. These symptoms or deficits are usually suggestive 
of a neurological or general medical condition (APA, 2000). Additionally, psychological 
factors are typically associated with the symptoms or deficits. An important feature of 
Conversion Disorder is termed ‘La Belle Indifference’, which means that most people 
who suffer from Conversion Disorder may present with either a relative lack of concern 
about the nature or implications of the symptoms or may present histrionically. These 
patients are often suggestible, and many are from rural populations, of low 
socioeconomic status, and have lesser knowledge regarding medical and psychological 
concepts. Conversion Disorder is more common in women than in men and, especially in 
women, symptoms are more common on the left side of the body. Up to 3% of outpatient 
referrals to mental health clinics, and from 1% to 14% of general medical/surgical 
inpatients, demonstrate symptoms of Conversion Disorder (APA, 2000). The DSM-IV- 
TR (APA, 2000) criteria for Conversion Disorder are:
• One or more symptoms or deficits affecting voluntary motor or sensory functions; 
these symptoms should suggest a neurological or other general medical condition.
• Psychological factors are associated with symptoms and/or deficits such that 
initiation or exacerbation of the symptoms and/or deficits is preceded by conflicts 
or other stressors.
• Cannot be fully explained by a general medical condition or direct effects of a 
substance
• Causes clinically significant impairment in various areas of functioning
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• Not limited to pain or sexual dysfunction, does not occur exclusively during the 
course of Somatization Disorder, is not better accounted for by another mental 
disorder
• Symptoms are not intentionally produced or feigned; not malingering
• Specific type of symptom and/or deficit:
o Motor 
o Sensory
o Seizures or Convulsions 
o Mixed Presentation 
Conversion Disorder can be very difficult to differentiate from malingering due to the 
fact that it often closely mimics a neurological or general medical condition. .
Pain Disorder is also difficult to differentiate from malingering in many cases. The 
defining quality of Pain Disorder is that pain is the predominant focus of the clinical 
attention (APA, 2000). Psychological factors must have an important role in the onset, 
severity, exacerbation, or maintenance of the pain. Individuals who suffer from Pain 
Disorder often have severe disruptions to their daily life, such as unemployment, 
disability, and family problems. Other potential problems for these patients are the 
development of Iatrogenic Opioid Dependence or Abuse and/or Benzodiazepine 
Dependence or Abuse. Pain Disorder can occur at any age, has an unclear prevalence 
rate, and is somewhat more common in females than in males. The DSM-IV-TR (APA, 
2000) for Pain Disorder includes:
• Pain in one or more anatomical sites as the clinical focus, with pain being severe 
enough to warrant clinical attention.
18
• Pain causes clinically significant distress in various areas of functioning
• Psychological factors are key in onset, severity, maintenance, or exacerbation of 
the pain
• Symptoms are not intentionally feigned; not malingering
• Not better accounted for by mood, anxiety, or psychotic disorders, and does not 
meet criteria for dyspareunia
• Subtypes:
o With Psychological Factors, Acute or Chronic
o With Both Psychologic^ Factors and a General Medical Condition, Acute 
or Chronic 
o With a General Medical Condition 
The difficulty in diagnosing Pain Disorder lies in the fact that there may actually be 
general medical findings associated with the pain. However, the pain may also be present 
in the absence of objective findings, or the objective findings may be coincidental to the 
pain.
The final Somatoform Disorder that relates to malingering is Hypochondriasis. This 
is the fear of having, or the idea that one has, a serious disease based on the person’s 
misinterpretation of bodily symptoms or bodily functions. Fears of aging and death are 
also common with this disorder as is “doctor-shopping” (APA, 2000). Precursors to the 
development o f Hypochondriasis fi-equently include serious illness in childhood and/or 
past experience with disease in a family member. The defining characteristic of this 
disorder is that neither laboratory findings nor physical examination findings confirm the 
individual’s preoccupations. Hypochondriasis has a prevalence rate of 1% to 5% in the
19
general population and of 2% to 7% in primary care outpatients. The DSM-IV-TR (APA, 
2000) for Hypochondriasis includes:
•  Preoccupation with the fear or having, or the idea that one has, a serious disease 
based upon the person’s misinterpretation of bodily symptoms or bodily functions
• This preoccupation persists despite appropriate medical evaluation and 
reassurance
• The belief is not delusional in intensity and is not restricted to a specific 
circumstance about appearance
• Causes clinically significant distress or impairment in multiple areas of 
functioning
• Lasts for at least six months
• Not better accounted for by GAD, OCD, Panic Disorder, Major Depressive 
Episode, Separation Anxiety, or another Somatoform Disorder
•  Specify:
o With Poor Insight
Hypochondriasis may be somewhat simpler to differentiate from malingering due to the 
fact that there are clearly no medical findings associated with the person’s preoccupation. 
Additionally, Hypochondriasis is not characterized so much by symptoms as by the fear 
of having symptoms.
Malingering
After having an understanding of traumatic brain injury and the psychological 
somatoform disorders that can at times mimic traumatic brain injury, the possibility of
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malingering, or the feigning of medical or psychological symptoms, must be considered 
to make an accurate differential diagnosis, particularly in cases where there is a known 
possibility for secondary gain such as a lawsuit. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual -  
IV- Text Revision (APA, 2000) defines malingering as “the intentional production of 
false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by external 
incentives such as avoiding military duty, avoiding work, obtaining financial 
compensation, evading criminal prosecution, or obtaining drugs” (APA, 2000, p. 739). 
Malingering may be conscious or unconscious in terms of the person’s awareness of 
motivation, but attempts to falsify test results are always deliberate. Greiffenstein et al. 
(2002) add to this definition of malingering by proposing that there may in fact be two 
types of malingering, generalized and domain-specific. They also posit that there may be 
three forms of malingering within these two types; the three forms include psychiatric, 
cognitive, and somatic malingering. Somatic malingering is defined by Greiffenstein et 
al. (2004) as being domain-specific and “the promotion of physical illness and weakness 
out of proportion to injury characteristic (p. 1598).” There must be a differentiation 
between exaggeration due to unconscious factors, inability to cooperate for emotional or 
neuropsychological reasons, or the inability to tolerate the stress of normal testing 
situations and malingering so that an accurate diagnosis can be made. Iverson et al. 
(2002) and Rogers, Sewell, and Ustad (1995) elaborate on this point by defining the 
difference between malingering and negative response bias. These researchers concur 
that negative response bias applies to exaggerated behavior with no reference to the 
motivation for that behavior; thus negative response bias is not necessarily synonymous 
with malingering. According to these studies, in order for an individual to be diagnosed
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with malingering, the negative response bias must be caused by the plausible attainment 
of some external, secondary gain.
Often malingerers feel justified in their actions rather than seeing it as deception or a 
criminal act (Golden & Grier, 1998). Malingering should be suspected in cases where 
there is a medico-legal presentation or in cases where there is a marked discrepancy 
between the individual’s claimed stress or disability and the objective findings.
Additional cues for clinicians to be aware o f with regards to potential malingering are a 
lack of cooperation during the diagnostic evaluation and in complying with the prescribed 
treatment regimen and the presence of Antisocial Personality Disorder. Malingering 
differs from Conversion Disorder and other Somatoform Disorders due to the presence of 
intentional symptom production, the obvious, external incentives associated with it, and 
the fact that suggestion and/or hypnosis often do not result in symptom relief (Golden & 
Grier, 1998).
Historically, the assessment of malingering has been quite difficult for clinicians. 
Malingering has traditionally been viewed as a moralistic, simplistic, or simply 
behavioral scheme coupled with a conscious desire to obtain money or drugs, to avoid 
work or prosecution, or to evade undesirable duties (Cunnien, 1988). Given that any 
psychiatric or physical disorder can be malingered, exaggerated, or faked, the diagnosis 
of malingering should be done with care and should take into consideration the presence 
of comorbid disorders such as genuine illness. Factitious Disorder, and Conversion 
Disorder. One way to differentiate between these potential comorbid disorders and 
malingering is that malingering is more often time limited and environmentally
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opportunistic while factitious disorders are more chronic and are typically accompanied 
by a history of prior faked illness and insistence on aggressive treatment (Cunnien, 1988).
According to Sweet (2000), the DSM-IV criteria for malingering can be insufficient 
for diagnosis; in fact, if  one followed these criteria exactly, many people would be 
diagnosed with malingering who were not actually feigning their symptoms. Therefore, 
other factors must be considered in the differential diagnosis of this disorder. Moderator 
variable are one such factor. Anastasi (1987) defined a moderator variable as any factor 
that meaningfully impacts the predictive relationship between other variables. Failure to 
consider moderator variables can result in false positive diagnostic conclusions with 
regard to brain injury. More importantly, with regard to malingering, failure to consider 
these factors could result in a patient seeming “too” impaired in light of the expectations 
associated with the alleged neurological condition; this is especially true when variables 
such as age and education are ignored.
Sweet (2000) also cites the low incidence of malingering as being key to making an 
accurate diagnosis. The vast majority of malingerers seen by neuropsychologists will be 
individuals who are involved in worker’s compensation, personal injury, or disability 
evaluations. Estimates o f the base rate occurrence of malingering in neuropsychological 
populations involved in litigation or ‘benefit seeking’ range from about 7.5 to 15% 
(Trueblood & Schmidt, 1993) to 8.5 to 14% (Frederick, Sarfaty, Johnston, & Powel,
1994) to 18 to 33% (Binder, 1993). Binder and Rohling (1996) found that individuals 
with lesser injuries were more likely to be pursuing financial incentives and were also 
more likely to display greater impairment.
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The assessment of malingering is further complicated by the fact that malingering is 
not typically dichotomous, and it is often accompanied by a selective presentation 
(Sweet, 2000). In other words, patients may perform inconsistently, giving their best 
ability on some measures while malingering on others. It is critical to remember that 
valid performance on some measures does not rule out malingering on others nor does 
malingering on some measures rule out valid performance on others. Research has found 
that malingerers are often not skilled at developing a credible neuropsychological profile 
because the general public does not have a good idea of what a head injury and its 
associated deficits actually entail (Gouvier, Prestholdt, & Warner, 1988; Wilier, Johnson, 
Rempel, & Linn, 1993). Due to this lack of knowledge on what types of symptoms to 
fake, malingerers may choose many or just particular measures on which to display their 
poor effort. These choices are made based upon their own belief system of what a brain- 
injured individual should look like.
An individual’s degree of intention and degree of exaggeration also must be 
considered in the diagnosis of malingering because without intentionality there cannot be 
a diagnosis of malingering and there may be some legitimate symptoms present that 
would require treatment that are simply being exaggerated. These can be quite 
challenging to measure. Intentionality cannot be determined with complete certainty; 
therefore, it is not possible to measure a person’s true degree of intention to malinger.
The degree of exaggeration can be equally difficult to assess because given more 
information about the actual nature of a disorder, subjects are able to more accurately 
fake deficits. In fact, most malingerers perform at or well above chance, with only a 
small percentage performing significantly below chance (Nies & Sweet, 1994).
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The malingering of variable deficits, the use of multiple strategies, and the presence 
of multiple dimensions of insufficient effort further complicate the assessment of 
malingering. Memory difficulties are the most frequent complaint of malingerers (Sweet, 
2000). However, other commonly malingered deficits include sensory-perceptual, motor, 
and cognitive impairments (Binder & Willis, 1992; Mittenberg, Rothole, Russell, & 
Heilbronner, 1996). Furthermore, the strategies used to malinger can vary between and 
within individuals. Beetar & Williams (1995) suggest that malingerers often use the 
following strategies: random responding, intentional wrong responses, delayed 
responding, and inattentiveness. Lastly, one must consider the possibility that multiple 
dimensions of insufficient effort may be present. For example, in cases where test 
performance cannot be accounted for by brain dysfunction or the presence of moderator 
variables, and is significantly worse than, or different from, performance standards 
known to be associated with genuine neurological deficits, other psychological disorders 
must be considered. In rare cases these disorders would include true depressive 
pseudodementia or atypical somatoform disorder. The degree to which individuals will 
consent to serious and protracted medical treatment regimens can help to clarify in this 
arena. True malingerers will typically not consent to these treatments, while the 
treatments are often, in fact, the goal for many individuals with somatoform and/or 
factitious disorders (Sweet, 2000).
Additionally, there are many potential sources for these false symptom reports. The 
diagnosis of malingering presumes that those who feign or grossly exaggerate 
psychological complaints after a head injury are producing these complaints based on 
sources other than accurate self-reports (Berry & Butcher, 1998). Some of the possible
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etiologies of false reports include exaggeration of actual experiences, difficulties that 
were experienced immediately after the injury but which have since subsided, complaints 
“borrowed” from role models (e.g., fellow patients) who have experienced considerable 
head injuries, popular media outlets, and health care workers who ask detailed questions 
about the presence of commonly experienced head injury symptomology may 
inadvertently give information on symptoms that the patient “should be” experiencing.
A final difficulty in the assessment of malingering has to do with the methodology 
that is commonly utilized to develop measures of malingering. As stated previously, 
there is no one widely accepted, standard measure of malingering, and most measures 
designed to detect malingering are developed using normal participants who are 
instructed to act as if they have suffered a head injury (Reitan & Wolfson, 2002). There 
are multiple problems with this method, the primary one being that college-aged 
individuals may not fully comprehend the implications of litigation for a head-injured 
individual. Reitan & Wolfson (2002) state that “normal subjects pretending to be brain­
damaged share none of the stresses, anxieties, guilt, depression, and desperation 
experienced by many litigants whose future financial stability may depend on the 
outcome of the neuropsychological examination (p.276).” Thus, the results of these 
studies may have limited generalizability. Conversely, research done with clinical 
samples may have increased generalizability, but lack the control of the experimental, 
analogue setting (Berry et al., 1995).
With so many obstacles to the assessment and diagnosis of malingering, it is not 
surprising that some of these factors are commonly overlooked in the interpretation of 
neuropsychological test results from patients with head injuries. One factor that is not
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only commonly overlooked, but is actually not even readily available, is the base rate for 
malingering. Base rates are best looked at as the current population prevalence (Gouvier, 
Hayes, & Smiroldo, 1998). If base rate data were readily available, it is thought that it 
would significantly improve the accuracy of malingering diagnoses. Even with tests of 
90% accuracy and 15% base rates, the classification of malingering is only slightly better 
than chance, and is nowhere near the accuracy that could be achieved using base rates 
alone. Problems with base rates can be overcome via history collection, records review, 
selecting tests that vary alone a sensitivity continuum, and retrospective self-report and 
collateral interviews (Gouvier, Hayes, & Smiroldo, 1998).
A second factor that is commonly overlooked in the assessment of traumatic brain 
injury and malingering is related to the sequelae of traumatic brain injury. As stated 
previously, the general public is surprisingly ignorant to what actually happens in TBI. 
Aubrey, Dobbs, & Rule (1989) examined the perceptions of college students regarding 
symptoms of head injury and whiplash. Most thought that physical symptoms were more 
common than cognitive symptoms in mild traumatic brain injuries. It follows, based 
upon this study, that people trying to feign mild traumatic brain injury may be more 
likely to portray physical symptoms. Gouvier, Presholdt, & Warner (1988) and Wilier, 
Johnson, Rempel, & Lirm (1993) further support these data. They found that 
misconceptions regarding traumatic brain injury might actually be pathognomonic signs 
of malingering when given by a patient or collateral during an interview. Despite these 
common misconceptions regarding traumatic brain injury, people can be somewhat 
effectively coached to more accurately fake a disorder. According to Wong et al. (1994), 
coaching tends to result in more accurately faked complaints. Furthermore, coaching also
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can lead to neuropsychological test results that are more similar to those of real patients 
than to those of naïve malingerers who have not been coached, but still tends to 
exaggerate neuropsychological performance deficits (Martin, Bolter, Todd, Gouvier, & 
Niccolls, 1993; Martin, Gouvier, Todd, Bolter, & Niccolls, 1992).
A final factor that is often overlooked in the assessment of malingering is the fact that 
the symptoms noted after a head injury can also be seen in the general population 
(Gouvier, Uddo-Crane, & Brown, 1988). However, these symptoms are seen at higher 
prevalence rates among personal injury claimants who have not sustained 
neuropsychological injuries (Lees-Haley & Brown, 1993). Among the most commonly 
reported symptoms of personal injury claimants are anxiety and nervousness (93%); 
however, over half of control subjects complain of these as well (Gouvier, Hayes, & 
Smiroldo, 1998). Other common symptoms include memory difficulties and headaches, 
hoth of which are found at similar frequencies between personal injury claimants and 
controls.
Slick, Sherman, and Iverson (1999) offer guidelines to overcome the difficulties that 
are often associated with the detection qf malingering. The authors’ suggested diagnostic 
criteria include psychometric, behavioral, and collateral data that are indicative of 
possible, probable, and definite malingering.
As stated previously, there are many limitations to the DSM-IV criteria for the 
diagnosis of malingering. The DSM-IV has defined malingering as “the intentional 
production of false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms, 
motivated by external incentives such as avoiding military duty, avoiding work, obtaining 
financial compensation, evading criminal prosecution, or obtaining drugs” (American
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Psychological Association, 1994, p.683 as quoted on p.546 of Slick, Sherman, & Iverson, 
1999). According to the authors, volition is critical in the DSM-IV definition of 
malingering as is the nature of the incentives. Volition is defined as conscious, self­
directed behavior by Slick, Sherman, and Iverson (1999). These two concepts are 
important because they help to differentiate between other clinical disorders that involve 
symptom exaggeration and/or fabrication. As stated in the article, the use of 
dichotomous criteria (e.g. external versus psychological incentives, volitional versus 
unconscious behavior) is easy when it is written into definitions, but it is not quite as 
clear in clinical practice to determine to what degree a behavior is volitional. 
Furthermore, it can also be very difficult to determine which incentive is primary in cases 
where there are both external and internal incentives. An example provided by the 
authors involves the comorbidity o f malingering and factitious disorder. According to 
the DSM-IV, such comorbidity is impossible, but there is no justification provided for 
this in spite o f the fact that psychological and financial incentives often co-exist and 
behavior can also be motivated by both internal and external incentives. These 
limitations have inspired several clinicians and researchers to develop alternative 
definitions and criteria for the diagnosis of malingering.
Rogers (1990) developed one possible set of specific diagnostic criteria for the 
malingering of psychiatric disturbance. These criteria involved multiple sources o f data 
fi-om across several domains, which included self-report, test scores, behavioral 
observations, and collateral information. His specific criteria included the endorsement 
of an unusually high number of rare symptoms, contradictory collateral information, and
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evidence o f exaggeration or fabrication of symptoms from standardized tests. However, 
no data have been reported on the reliability, validity, or utility o f these criteria.
Greiffenstein et al. (1994) developed a set of criteria for the diagnosis of ‘overt’ 
malingering of memory dysfunction. These criteria were specifically designed for use in 
neuropsychological settings, especially for use with postconcussive patients who were 
litigating. The four criteria are as follows; “improbably poor performance on two or 
more neuropsychological measures, total disability in a major social role, contradiction 
between collateral sources and symptom history, and remote memory loss” (p.547). 
Multiple studies (Greiffenstein et al., 1994; Greiffenstein, Gola, & Baker, 1995) were 
able to show clinically significant associations between classifications made using their 
index and scores on malingering measures, including forced-choice tests of symptom 
validity. This is not to say that these criteria are without limitations. The limitations 
include: not including an explicit definition of malingering, not specifying rule-out 
conditions or differential diagnoses, not including behavioral observations, 
underspecified criteria, and being restricted to the evaluation of feigned memory deficits 
only without providing guidelines for the evaluation of other neurocognitive domains.
Another set of criteria, which contrasts with the DSM-IV focus on motivation or 
volition, has been developed by Pankratz. Pankratz argues, “Intentions, awareness, 
conscious purposes, and psychodynamics should not be the main focus of the diagnostic 
process (Pankratz & Erickson, 1990, p.386 as cited on p.547). According to these 
criteria, it is not possible to accurately assess intent and volition, and thus, a diagnosis of 
malingering should not be dependent upon judgments about an individual’s internal 
states. Pankratz and Binder (1997) developed a list o f behaviors that are indicative of
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malingering. The behaviors are as follows: marked inconsistency between reported and 
observed symptoms; marked inconsistency between diagnosis and neuropsychological 
findings; resistance avoidance, or hizarre responses on standardized tests; failure on 
specific measures o f faking; functional findings on medical examination; and late onset 
of cognitive complaints following accident. Although Pankratz makes a compelling case 
for these criteria, there are still some limitations. Unquestionably, inferences about 
internal states and processes always have some level of uncertainty. However, the 
diagnosis of malingering is far from alone in this regard; many other DSM-IV diagnoses 
require a clinical judgment about an individual’s inner state. According to Slick, 
Sherman, and Iverson (1999) “unless all cases of exaggeration or fabrication of deficits 
constitute malingering, then the exclusion of any methods or guidelines for making a 
determination about volition and intent is a significant limitation of purely behavioral 
approaches to diagnosing malingering.
Pankratz is not the only researcher to consider behavioral manifestations of 
malingering. Faust and Ackley (1998) also developed a list of behaviors that may be 
indicative of “intentional” inaccuracies in neuropsychological test data. These behaviors 
include: poor effort on testing, exaggeration of symptoms, fabrication of symptoms, false 
attributions (purposefully withholding or distorting history concerning other causes of 
symptoms), presenting a false baseline (purposefully withholding or distorting 
information about premorhid functioning), denial or failure to acknowledge strengths, 
positive abilities, or positive areas of functioning. These authors go on to state that “two 
basic dimensions, falsification and intentionality, are inherent or intrinsic components of
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malingering... [and]...to identify malingering, both dimensions will need to be assessed” 
(p. 19 as cited in Slick et al., 1999, p.548).
As indicated by the research described above, there are a wide variety o f methods 
and measures that are currently used to determine whether an individual is fabricating or 
exaggerating symptoms during a neuropsychological evaluation. These methods and 
measures include; inconsistencies or other signs from the individual’s reported 
symptoms, inconsistencies or other signs from standard neuropsychological tests, and 
measures or indices specifically designed to detect faking of cognitive deficits. Slick et 
al. (1999) have developed a new proposed set of criteria to assist in the diagnosis of 
malingering. Several guidelines, based upon Nies and Sweet (1994), were used to guide 
the development of these criteria. The guidelines were the need for: a specific definition 
of malingering of cognitive dysfimction within the context of the neuropsychological 
assessment; specific, unambiguous, and reliable criteria that cover all possible sources of 
evidence (i.e., test-performance, observations, and collateral data); specification of the 
relative importance of diagnostic criteria; specification of the nature and role of clinical 
judgment; specification of differential diagnoses and exclusionary criteria; and 
specification of levels of diagnostic certainty. Based upon these guidelines, the authors 
developed a detailed set o f criteria to diagnose Possible, Probable, and Definite 
Malingering of Neurocognitive Dysfimction. Slick et al. (1999) define Malingering of 
Neurocognitive Dysfunction as “ .. .the volitional exaggeration or fabrication of cognitive 
dysfunction for the purpose of obtaining substantial material gain, or avoiding or 
escaping formal duty or responsibility. Substantial material gain includes money, goods, 
or services of nontrivial value (e.g., financial compensation for personal injury. Formal
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duties are actions that people are legally obligated to perform (e.g., prison, military, or 
public service, or child support payments or other financial obligations). Formal 
responsibilities are those that involve accountability or liability in legal proceedings (e.g., 
competency to stand trial)” (p.552). These criteria were developed, and are widely 
accepted and utilized, inductively from neuropsychological practice and reasoning. Thus, 
there has been no study analyzing the reliability o f these criteria. They are cited in 
multiple publications on the subject of malingering, including Larrabee (2003a). The 
three levels of diagnostic certainty are described as follows:
Definite Malingering of Neurocognitive Dysfunction
“.. .indicated by the presence of clear and compelling evidence of volitional exaggeration 
or fabrication o f cognitive dysfimction and the absence of plausible alternative 
explanations.” Specific criteria:
• Presence of a substantial external incentive [Criterion A]
• Definite negative response bias [Criterion Bl]
• Behaviors meeting necessary criteria from group B are not frilly accounted for by 
Psychiatric, Neurological, or Developmental Factors [Criterion D]
Probable Malingering o f Neurocognitive Dysfunction
“ ...indicated by the presence of evidence strongly suggesting volitional exaggeration or 
fabrication of cognitive dysfunction and the absence of plausible alternative 
explanations.” Specific criteria:
• Presence o f substantial external incentive [Criterion A]
• Two or more types o f evidence from neuropsychological testing, excluding 
definite negative response bias [two or more of Criteria B2-B6]
OR
• One type of evidence from neuropsychological testing, excluding negative 
response bias and one or more types of evidence from Self-Report [one of Criteria 
B2-B6 and one or more of Criteria C 1 -C5]
• Behaviors meeting neeessary eriteria from groups B and C are not fully accounted 
for by Psychiatric, Neurological, or Developmental Factors [Criterion D]
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Possible Malingering o f Neurocognitive Dysfunction
“ ...indicated by the presence of evidence suggesting volitional exaggeration or 
fabrication of cognitive dysfunction and the absence of plausible alternative explanations. 
Alternatively, possible MND is indicated by the presence of criteria necessary for 
Definite or Probably MND except that other primary etiologies cannot be ruled out.” 
Specific criteria:
• Presence of substantial external incentive [Criterion A]
• Evidence from self-report [one or more of Criteria C1-C5]
• Behaviors meeting necessary criteria from group C are not fully accounted for by 
Psychiatric, Neurological, or Developmental Factors [Criterion D]
OR
• Criteria for Definite or Probable MND are met except for Criterion D (i.e., 
primary psychiatric, neurological, or developmental etiologies cannot be ruled 
out). In these cases, the alternative etiologies that cannot be ruled out must be 
specified.
Explanation o f Criteria
Criteria A: Presence o f a Substantial External Incentive
“At least one clearly identifiable and substantial external incentive for exaggeration or 
fabrication of symptoms is present at the time of examination (e.g., personal injury 
settlement, disability pension, evasion of criminal prosecution, or release from military 
service).”
Criteria B: Evidence from Neuropsychological Testing
“Evidence of exaggeration or fabrication o f cognitive dysfunction on neuropsychological 
tests as demonstrated by at least one of the following:
1. Definite Negative Response Bias. Below chance performance (p < .05) on one or 
more forced-choice measures of cognitive function.
2. Probable Response Bias. Performance on one or more well-validated 
psychometric tests or indices designed to measure exaggeration or fabrication of 
cognitive deficits is consistent with feigning.
3. Discrepancy between Test Data and Known Patterns o f Brain Functioning. A 
pattern of neuropsychological test performance that is markedly discrepant from 
currently accepted models of normal and abnormal central nervous system 
function. The discrepancy must be consistent with an attempt to exaggerate or 
fabricate neuropsychological dysfunction (e.g., a patient performs in the severely 
impaired range on verbal attention measures but in the average range on memory 
testing; a patient misses items on recognition testing that were consistently 
provided on previous free recall trials, or misses many easy items when 
significantly harder items from the same test are passed.
4. Discrepancy between Test Data and Observed Behavior. Performance on two or 
more neuropsychological tests within a domain are discrepant with observed level
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of cognitive function in a way that suggests exaggeration or fabrication of 
dysfunction (e.g., a well-educated patient who presents with no significant visual- 
perceptual deficits or language disturbance in conversational speech performs in 
the severely impaired range on verbal fluency and confrontation naming tests).
5. Discrepancy between Test Data and Reliable Collateral Reports. Performance on 
two or more neuropsychological tests within a domain are discrepant with day-to- 
day level of cognitive function described by at least one reliable collateral 
informant in a way that suggests exaggeration or fabrication of dysfunction (e.g., 
a patient handles all family finances but is unable to perform simple math 
problems in testing).
6. Discrepancy between Test Data and Documented Background History. 
Improbably poor performance on two or more standardized tests o f cognitive 
function within a specific domain (e.g., memory) that is inconsistent with 
documented neurological or psychiatric history (e.g., a patient with no 
documented LOG or PTA, multiple negative neurological investigations, and no 
other history of CNS trauma or disease consistently obtains verbal memory scores 
in the severely impaired range after a motor vehicle accident).”
Criteria C: Evidence from Self-Report
“The following behaviors are indicators o f possible malingering of cognitive deficits, but 
their presence is not sufficient for the diagnosis. However, presence o f one or more of 
these criteria provides additional evidence in support of a diagnosis of malingering.
These criteria involve significant inconsistencies or discrepancies in the patient’s self- 
reported symptoms that suggest a deliberate attempt to exaggerate or fabricate cognitive 
deficits.
1. Self-reported History is Discrepant with Documented History. Reported history 
is markedly discrepant with documented medical or psychosocial history and 
suggests attempts to exaggerate injury severity or deny premorhid 
neuropsychological dysfunction (e.g., exaggerated severity of physical injury or 
length of LOC/PTA; exaggerated premorhid educational or occupational 
achievement; denial of previous head injury or previous psychiatric history).
2. Self-reported Symptoms are Discrepant with Known Patterns o f Brain 
Functioning. Reported or endorsed symptoms are improbable in number, 
patterns, or severity; or markedly inconsistent with expectations for the type or 
severity of documented injury or pathology (e.g., claims of extended retrograde 
amnesia without loss of memory for the accident, or claims of loss of 
autobiographical information after mild head trauma without LOG).
3. Self-reported Symptoms are Discrepant with Behavioral Observations. Reported 
symptoms are markedly inconsistent with observed behavior (e.g., a patient 
complains of severe episodic memory deficits yet has little difficulty 
remembering names, events, or appointments; a patient complains of severe 
cognitive deficits yet has little difficulty driving independently and arrives on 
time for an appointment in an unfamiliar area; a patient complains of severely 
slowed mentation and concentration problems yet easily follows complex 
conversation).
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' mf-rsDorted Symptoms are Discrepant with Information Obtained from 
Collateral Informants. Reported symptoms, history, or observed behavior is 
inconsistent with information obtained from other informants judged to be 
adequately reliable. The discrepancy must be consistent with an attempt to 
exaggerate injury severity or deny premorhid neuropsychological dysfunction 
(e.g., a patient reports severe memory impairment and/or behaves as if  severely 
memory-impaired, but their spouse reports that the patient has minimal memory 
dysfunction at home.
5. Evidence o f Exaggerated or Fabricated Psychological Dysfunction. Self-reported 
symptoms of psychological dysfunction are substantially contradicted by 
behavioral observations and/or reliable collateral information. Well-validated 
validity scales or indices on self-report measures of psychological adjustment 
(e.g., MMPI-2) are strongly suggestive o f exaggerated or fabricated distress or 
dysfunction.”
Criteria D: Behaviors Meeting Necessary Criteria from Groups B or C are Not Fully 
Accountedfor by Psychiatric, Neurological, or Developmental Factors.
“Behaviors meeting necessary criteria from groups B and C are the product of an 
informed, rational, and volitional effort aimed at least in part towards acquiring or 
achieving external incentives as described in Criteria A. As such, behaviors meeting 
criterion from groups B or C cannot be fully accounted for by psychiatric, developmental, 
or neurological disorders that result in significantly diminished capacity to appreciate 
laws or mores against malingering, or inability to conform to behavior to such standards 
(e.g., psychological need to “play the sick role”, or in resnonse to command 
hallucinations.”
The article goes on to list some additional considerations that may play a role in the 
diagnosis of malingering. These include informed consent, such that in the process of 
obtaining the informed consent the patient should be assisted in understanding that a 
consistently high level of effort is required and told that any evidence of poor or 
inconsistent effort, or exaggeration or fabrication of dysfunction will be noted in resulting 
reports. Other items that should be considered are differential diagnoses, the concept of 
“ruling out” malingering, the reliability, validity, and standardized administration of the 
diagnostic measures utilized, individual differences, prior patient behavior, clinical 
judgment, and self-reported sjmiptoms.
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Finally, the Slick et al. (1999) point out contrasting points of view, caveats, 
recommendations, and conclusions. Throughout the years, the diagnosis of malingering 
has certainly not gone unquestioned. Erickson has stated that “the diagnosis of 
malingering is a weak diagnosis of exclusion that served to justify the denial of treatment 
and benefits,” and that “were it not for some medicolegal expectations, we could do 
without the diagnosis entirely” (Pankratz & Erickson, 1990, p. 381). Rogers (1990) goes 
on to offer a counterpoint to the moralistic conceptualization of the diagnosis of 
malingering, an “adaptational model...in which the malingerer perceives an adversarial 
context and chooses feigning on the basis of likelihood and expected utility” (p. 182). 
These concerns are especially valid in cases where patients have comorhid malingered 
deficits with actual deficits that may be treatable. However, these cases do not eliminate 
the need for further clarification of the diagnostic criteria for malingering.
Slick et al. (1999) also consider the potential limitations of their diagnostic 
criteria, one heing the role of clinical judgment. The authors feel that well-trained 
clinicians who utilize a variety of reliable and valid data to assist in their decision are 
certainly capable of making clinical judgments regarding volition and intent. 
Furthermore, the guidelines set forth in this article do provide substantial guidance for 
making these clinical inferences. These criteria were designed to “balance specificity 
with flexibility, (p. 558). The authors do acknowledge that no two cases are identical, or 
for that matter, even similar, and no one set of diagnostic criteria can cover every 
potential set of data and circumstances. Thus, these criteria are meant to guide clinicians 
in a flexible manner in making these diagnostic decisions. When diagnosing
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malingering, it is crucial that a clinician rule out the alternatives; these criteria are meant 
to assist competent clinicians in this process.
Assessment of Malingering
After considering what malingering is, what disorders malingering must be 
differentiated from, and the obstacles associated with detecting malingering, the question 
arises, what measures and techniques can be utilized to accomplish this task? This 
question is not easily answered as there are in fact many measures and techniques that 
can be used. However, it then becomes a question of determining which measure or 
technique most frequently is able to accurately diagnose malingering, or perhaps, more 
specifically, which measure is most frequently able to accurately diagnose malingering in 
personal injury litigation cases.
Some methods for assessing malingering utilize a variety of response options. One 
alternative methodology is the use of the forced-choice technique. Examples of 
assessments that utilize the forced-choice technique are the Test of Memory Malingering 
(TOMM; Tombaugh, 2002) and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory -  2 
(MMPI-2; Butcher, Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 1989). Both of these 
will be discussed in detail in subsequent segments of this review; however, these are 
examples of the forced-choice technique because they offer only two stimuli to a 
participant (pictures on the TOMM and true or false questions on the MMPI-2) and force 
the individual to make a choice between the two. According to Nies & Sweet (1994), 
the detection of malingering is not easy but it is possible with adequate effort. Gutierrez 
& Gur (1998) offer guidelines for the development of malingering screens. These
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guidelines include a patient exhibiting near misses to simple questions (Pankratz, 1988), 
gross discrepancies from expected norms (Larrabee, 1990), inconsistency between 
diagnosis and neuropsychological findings, resistance, avoidance, bizarre responses, 
inconsistencies between reported and observed symptoms, marked discrepancies between 
measures that assess similar cognitive abilities, and failure on specific measures of 
neuropsychological malingering. These guidelines helped lead to the development of 
forced-choice techniques to assess malingering.
Forced-choice techniques were developed based upon the idea that misconceptions 
about head injuries among the general public can be helpfiil to neuropsychologists as they 
are the basis for symptom validity testing (Pankratz, 1988). Other researchers support 
symptom validity testing in the detection of malingering as being simple yet effective 
(Faust et al., 1991). Symptom validity testing is based on the binomial distribution 
theory, which helps to establish clinical procedures that produce below-chance levels of 
performance, which, in turn, can be indicative of malingering. For example, classic 
studies done using a “blind” patient who was suspected of malingering found that 
although this individual performed significantly below chance on assessments initially, 
after he was told that the expectation of a truly blind person was at least 50% correct (or 
chance) his responses improved to within the chance level (Brady & Lind, 1961; Grosz & 
Zimmerman, 1965).
The key feature of forced-choice techniques is that they are constructed precisely for 
the presenting complaint and to anticipate the responses of reluctant individuals. This 
method proves to be very challenging for those who are trying to malinger because they 
are either exposed as a fraud or it is found out that the deficit is not as serious as claimed.
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Essentially, this method exploits the lack of knowledge of the general public regarding 
head injuries in order to determine exaggeration.
In what follows, multiple tests to diagnose malingering will be described in three 
categories. First, neuropsychological test batteries that are characterized by the use of 
multiple tests taken together, and that can be compared both on an intraindividual and an 
interindividual level will be considered. Second, tests of memory impairment that 
specifically assess for common misconceptions about the symptoms of head injury will 
be reviewed. Lastly, a personality inventory, the MMPI-2, will be analyzed for its ability 
to detect malingering.
Neuropsychological Test Batteries
Research on malingering has seldom utilized an entire test battery, but rather has 
more frequently utilized the administration of a single test or examined a single set of 
performances. Individual tests are typically interpreted in terms of how well they are 
performed, with scores lower than expected usually thought to indicate malingering. This 
method is difficult to apply with any degree of accuracy due to its simplicity. However, 
test batteries produce scores that allow for comparison of the individual’s performance 
across a range of tests. These scores can be compared to each other (intraindividual) and 
with normative data (interindividual). If the test battery was specific and sensitive for 
brain injury, one may be able to separate legitimate indications of brain damage from 
feigned scores (Reitan & Wolfson, 1998). The Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological Test 
Battery and the Halstead Reitan Neuropsychological Battery both fit into this category.
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Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological Battery
A commonly used neuropsychological measure in the detection of malingering is the 
Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological Battery (LNNB; Golden & Grier, 1998). The 
LNNB was originally designed when malingering was not factored into test development, 
but it is still useful in the detection of malingering. There are three forms of the Luria- 
Nebraska Neuropsychological Battery. The first two are very similar, consisting of 
twelve basic clinical scales plus scales designed for specific additional purposes. The 
themes of these scales include: motor, tactile, rhythm, visual, receptive, expressive, 
reading, writing, arithmetic, memory, intelligence, intermediate memory, and 
pathognomonic. The pathognomonic scale was designed to measure acuteness and 
general functional seriousness of brain injuries. The scales are scored as 0 (normal), 1 
(borderline), or 2 (abnormal), and are reported as T-scores with a mean of 50 and a 
standard deviation of 10 (Golden & Grier, 1998). Higher scores are indicative of greater 
dysfunction, and abnormal scores are determined by a critical level based upon age and 
educational level. The critical level can vary from 50 to 70. The third, and most recent, 
form of the Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological Battery is a substantially revised version 
developed through the factor analysis of results from the original scales. The following 
scales were added: nonverbal sound interpretation, visual-intellectual skills, speeded 
repetition, reading comprehension, spelling, revised memory scales, and separate scales 
for visual and verbal memory. An additional alteration to this form is that lower scores 
are indicative o f greater dysfunction.
There are six major approaches to using the Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological 
Battery in the detection o f malingering (Golden & Grier, 1998). The first approach
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involves utilizing other tests specifically designed to detect malingering in addition to the 
LNNB. Symptom Validity Testing (SVT; Bernard, 1990) described above is one such 
addition. SVT consists of any multiple trial, forced choice activity designed to detect 
feigned cognitive or sensory impairment. A typical example is any task that asks subjects 
to recognize a previously presented stimulus fi’om among two stimuli (Guilmette, Hart, & 
Giuliano, 1993). Performance below chance on such a measure is suggestive of 
malingering. The Portland Digit Recognition Test (PDRT; Binder, 1993), a forced 
choice recognition memory test, is a specific example of a symptom validity test. Binder 
and Willis (1991) found that individuals with brain damage who were not seeking 
financial compensation performed significantly better on the PDRT than mild head injury 
patients who were seeking compensation. Poor performance on the PDRT has also been 
found to be associated with a motivation to exaggerate impairment for financial gain 
(Binder, 1993). Furthermore, Hiscock and Hiscock (1989) and Binder (1993) found that 
patients seeking financial compensation performed worse on the PDRT items that seemed 
more difficult than patients not seeking financial compensation. It appears that increased 
perceived item difficulty may cause a person inclined to malinger to perform less well on 
tasks that appear hard than on tasks that appear easy.
Other tests that support these conclusions, and can be used in conjunction with the 
Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological Battery, include the Hiscock Digit-Memory Test 
(HDMT; Slick, Hopp, Strauss, Hunter, & Pinch, 1994; Hiscock & Hiscock, 1989) and the 
Seashore Rhythm Test. The HDMT provides an alternative to more obvious measures of 
motivation that are disguised as memory tests. Slick et al. (1994) found that all subjects 
faking memory impairment performed significantly worse than brain injury patients.
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especially on items that seemed more difficult. The Seashore Rhythm Test provides 
similar results. Gfeller, Cradock, and Falkenhain (1994) found that subjects faking 
cognitive impairments performed significantly worse than those instructed to perform 
optimally.
The second approach to using the LNNB to detect malingering involves the use of 
specific formulas or LNNB scores. Mensch and Woods (1986) studied people with 
average and above-average IQ’s who were offered a small reward for faking brain injury. 
It was hypothesized that those with above-average IQ’s would be more capable of faking 
than those with average IQ’s. The analyses included sex, IQ, and whether or not the 
person was given instructions to fake symptoms; results indicated that only the 
instructions to fake were significant. Additionally, only 16% of those instructed to fake 
generated deficits on the Pathognomonic scale. Thus, it can be said that the 
Pathognomonic scale is sensitive to malingering.
Other methods for using the LNNB to assess for malingering involve the test items 
themselves. A forced-choice analysis o f the LNNB is possible because many items on 
the measure are yes or no questions, which are essentially forced-choice. Therefore, the 
same chance analysis that can be used on the Portland Digit Recognition Test and others 
like it can be done on certain LNNB items (Golden & Grier, 1998). The internal 
consistency of the LNNB items can also be important in using this measure to detect 
malingering. The Luria Nebraska Neuropsychological Battery scales show high internal 
consistency, but measure a specific domain (e.g. motor skills) by combining those skills 
with a variety of other skills (Golden & Grier, 1998). Specific cross-scale item 
correlations are indicative of the presence of a basic deficit. However, malingerers will
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not know that these relationships exist, so they will be likely to eonsistently show poor 
performanee in one area but not on the other items that are on other seales that are highly 
eorrelated with the poor performanee area. Consequently, this method serves as a very 
good eheek on an individual’s overall profile.
Test-retest reliability and item eonsisteney of the Luria Nebraska Neuropsyehologieal 
Test Battery also serve a purpose when using this measure to deteet malingering. With 
regard to test-retest reliability, the LNNB does not rely on novelty very mueh because it 
tests more basic skills (Golden & Grier, 1998). It has higher than average test-retest 
reliability and the test interval can be relatively short. Retest scores are expected to be 
within 10 T-seore points of the prior testing. Malingerers tend to have mueh greater 
discrepancies, but the direction of the change is unpredictable. If an individual had two 
or more seales differ by more than ten points on retest, it should arouse suspicion in the 
clinician. Four or more seales that differ by more than ten points on retest vsdthout the 
client’s condition changing would be indicative of malingering (Golden & Grier, 1998). 
Item eonsisteney is similar to overall scale test-retest eonsisteney, but looks at the item 
level. Across multiple test administrations, the level o f agreement across items in both 
normal and brain-injured individuals whose conditions are stable is high. Golden, Berg, 
and Graber (1982) and Plaisted & Golden (1982) found perfect item agreement in at least 
90% of retest clients who were not malingering. Therefore, retest agreements of less than 
90% at the item level could be evidence of malingering.
The final method for utilizing the Luria Nebraska Neuropsyehologieal Test Battery in 
the assessment of malingering is to examine the eonsisteney of the test results with the 
individual’s history and previous neuropsyehologieal test results (Golden & Grier, 1998).
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The relationship between neuropsychological findings and neurological and historical 
findings is not exactly one to one, but a well-documented relationship exists.
Halstead-Reitan Neuropsychological Battery
The Halstead-Reitan Neuropsychological Battery is a widely used measure for 
detecting traumatic brain injury. This measure can also be used to detect malingering and 
invalid test results. Most of the studies that have been conducted to develop a valid scale 
to detect malingering have utilized normal participants who were instructed to pretend 
that they had a brain injury while taking neuropsychological tests (Franzen, Iverson, & 
McCracken, 1990). There are two major problems with this research. The first is the 
assumption that normal subjects instructed to fake the types o f deficits that would result 
from a head injury would actually be able to simulate the neuropsychological impairment 
caused by brain damage (Reitan & Wolfson, 1998). This is problematic because normal 
subjects that pretend to have brain damage experience none of the stresses, anxieties, 
depression, guilt, and desperation that are experienced by many litigants whose future 
financial situation could depend on the outcome of neuropsychological testing. The other 
problem with this approach is that the results are only able to obtain, at best, a certain 
level of statistical significance (Reitan & Wolfson, 1998). Current methods only give a 
probability statement about the likelihood that intergroup differences are the result of 
chance. The Halstead Reitan Neuropsychological Battery fits into this category o f test.
There are multiple ways that the HRNB can be employed in the detection of 
malingering. The first is the use o f intraindividual test scores to identify invalid test 
results. Psychologists usually depend on the level of performance when determining an 
individual’s neuropsychological functioning (Reitan & Wolfson, 1998). Some
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psychiatrie and neurological conditions are thought to be associated with impaired 
performance, but many individuals with such conditions perform within the normal 
range. The fact that some test scores can fall into the normal range and some into the 
impaired range for the same individual leads to a second approach to evaluating test 
scores. To clarify, an individual with brain damage may perform poorly on tests that are 
sensitive to brain damage and well on tests that are not sensitive to brain damage. 
Therefore, a clinician should review a subject’s test scores and determine whether there 
are inconsistencies in performance that exceed the limits of probability (Reitan & 
Wolfson, 1998).
Invalid test results on the HRNB can also be identified by comparing two or more test 
administrations. Most psyehometrie approaches to deteet malingering have evaluated test 
scores based on a single examination or level of performance (Reitan & Wolfson, 1998). 
Because malingerers are not the only ones who perform poorly on neuropsyehologieal 
tests, this method is flawed. Additionally, malingerers may earn relatively good scores 
on a test even though they are not giving their best effort and are performing below their 
optimal level. Comparing an individual’s scores on the same test administered on two 
different occasions may be a better approach to detecting malingering (Reitan &
Wolfson, 1998). This method uses the subject as his or her own control, and avoids the 
implicit problems of interindividual evaluations. Inconsistencies that are commonly 
observed by using this method indicate that those who are not putting forth their best 
possible effort respond less eonsistently than those who are not influenced by 
circumstantial factors such as litigation (Reitan & Wolfson, 1998).
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Memory Impairment
The main reason for developing memory impairment malingering tests was the need 
for a specific test to detect the faking of memory impairment, and the fact that during the 
mid-1990’s there was a failure of methods available to meet this need. Additionally, 
there was much debate in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s as to whether or not 
neuropsychologists were able to detect malingering based on neuropsychological test 
scores (Arkes, Faust, & Guilmette, 1990; Barth, Ryan, & Hawk, 1992; Bigler, 1990). 
This debate was not conclusive, but most involved thought that detecting malingering 
based only upon neuropsychological test scores was highly problematic. This is likely 
because inconsistency is the hallmark of malingering in that it can range from grossly 
exaggerated differences in scores between faked and legitimate symptoms to a pattern of 
scores that simply does not make “neurological sense”. Thus, it is impractical to try to 
use these inconsistencies to identify malingering.
Tombaugh (2002) identified several qualitative signs of malingering on tests of 
cognitive ability. These qualitative signs include memory impairment that is 
disproportionate with the severity of the injury, discrepancies between scores on tests 
measuring similar abilities, inconsistencies between memory complaints and observed 
behavior, failing easy items on a test while passing more difficult ones, increased 
frequency of “I don’t know” answers, increased frequency of near misses or approximate 
answers, pronounced decline in performance on delayed recognition tests, scores on 
recognition tests are relatively lower than scores on recall tests, and the profile of test 
scores not making “neurological sense”. Tombaugh (2002) went on to utilize these 
qualitative signs to develop criteria for developing a test designed to detect memory
47
malingering. His criteria stated that the test should be sensitive to the faking of memory 
deficits, but should not be sensitive to any other factors that typically produce a memory 
deficit. Therefore, this test should be insensitive to the effects of demographic variables, 
traumatic brain injury, neuropsychological disorders, and affective disorders. Tombaugh 
(2002) also stated that these tests should have greater perceived difficulty than actual 
difficulty, high face validity as a test of memory, and universal application.
Test of Memory Malingering
The Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM) is yet another measure that can be used in 
the detection of malingering (Tombaugh, 2002). The TOMM was developed to provide 
an objective, criterion-based psychometric test that can differentiate between people with 
actual memory impairment and those who are faking the symptoms of memory 
impairment. Thé qualitative signs and criteria described above led to the development of 
the Test of Memory Malingering.
The TOMM consists of two learning trials and a retention trial (Tombaugh, 2002). It 
has been validated with both a clinical and non-elinieal sample. A clinical sample was 
used to determine if performance on the TOMM was affected by various types of 
neurological impairment, and to provide a set of clinically based norms that would allow 
for direct comparison between TOMM scores obtained fi-om a person suspected of 
malingering and TOMM scores obtained fi'om a person with similar levels of 
neurological damage/injury but not suspected o f malingering (Tombaugh, 2002). 
Essentially, the clinically based norms provide a baseline where the performance of 
suspected malingerers could be compared to the performance of non-malingerers. The 
TOMM also has empirically based criterion scores. A person can get 50% correct on the
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TOMM just by guessing. The range for chance performance is 18 to 32 (Tombaugh, 
2002). Scores below 18 are unlikely to occur by chance, which implies that the person 
knew what the correct answer was but intentionally chose the incorrect answer.
Word Memory Test
The Word Memory Test (WMT) can also be used to determine whether or not an 
individual is feigning symptoms or is not performing optimally on neuropsychological 
tests (Green, Lees-Haley, & Allen, 2002). The WMT is made up of measures that are 
very sensitive to exaggeration or poor effort, but are very sensitive to all but the most 
extreme forms of cognitive impairment. This test, which has been extensively validated 
in clinical forensic settings, measures verbal learning and memory, and has been designed 
to allow for evaluation o f a person’s effort to do well. Thus, it can determine whether or 
not test scores are valid estimates of an individual’s ability. The Word Memory Test 
assesses a person’s ability to leam a list of 20 word pairs presented either orally or on a 
computer screen across multiple subtests. These subtests include Immediate Recall, 
Delayed Recognition, Multiple Choice, Paired Associates, Delayed Free Recall, and 
Long Delayed Free Recall; each subtest varies widely in its objective difficulty level 
(Green, Lees-Haley, & Allen, 2002). It is very difficult for a person who is not making a 
full effort to produce a valid profile on the WMT. Patients with moderate to severe brain 
injuries can obtain scores of about 95% (above 38 out of 40 correct) on the Immediate 
Recall and Delayed Recognition trials while healthy controls had mean scores above 97% 
(Green, Lees-Haley, & Allen, 2002). This indicates that these WMT scales are unrelated 
to major measures of head injury severity. Further support for this statement is found
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when one considers that those with mild head injuries score, on average, significantly 
lower on the WMT with regard to effort than people with the most severe brain injuries.
Differentiating Between Head Injury, Somatization Disorder,
& Malingering
Although all of the tests outlined above are able to detect malingering of traumatic 
brain injury to some degree, none of these measures is designed to differentiate between 
traumatic brain injury and a somatization disorder. Since it can be difficult to determine 
whether or not someone is malingering or suffering from a somatization disorder as 
reviewed above, these two possibilities need to be differentiated when conducting a 
neuropsychological assessment. Thus, there is a need for an additional means of 
detecting malingering that can effectively differentiate brain injury and somatization 
disorder. It is also critical that measures that are utilized to detect malingering not be too 
heavily skewed toward somatic complaints, which can result in individuals with 
somatization disorders being diagnosed as malingerers. A balance between detecting 
malingering and detecting somatization disorder must be achieved in order for proper 
diagnosis and treatment to occur. One measure that takes into account the possibility of 
somatization disorder in the detection of malingering is the forced-choice Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory -  2 (MMPI-2). However, the empirical question 
remains, does this measure rely too heavily on somatic complaints to accurately 
differentiate between malingerers and those with a somatization disorder? It is to this and 
other considerations of the MMPI-2 that we turn next.
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Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory - 2
Like the above neuropsychological and memory impairment methods, the Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory -  2 (MMPI-2; Butcher, Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, 
& Kaemmer, 1989) can be used to detect the feigning of head injury symptoms (Berry & 
Butcher, 1998). The MMPI-2 is the most commonly used test of personality and 
psychopathology in general forensic evaluations and forensic neuropsychological 
evaluations (Lees-Haley, 1992; Lees-Haley, Smith, Williams, & Duim, 1995). It consists 
of ten clinical scales, which include Hypochondriasis, Depression, Hysteria,
Psychopathic Deviate, Masculinity-Femininity, Paranoia, Psychasthenia, Schizophrenia, 
Hypomania, and Social Introversion. This measure also has well-developed validity 
scales for assessing the possibility of response sets in answering test questions (Pope, 
Butcher, & Seelen, 1993) as well as seven standard scales for the assessment of possible 
invalid approaches to the test.
Psychopathology that can occur following a head injury that relates to the clinical 
scales of the MMPI-2 include the following: irritability, agitation, belligerence, anger, 
violence, impulsiveness, impatience, restlessness, social inappropriateness, lability, 
anxiety, sensitivity to noise, suspiciousness, delusions, paranoia, mania, spontaneity, 
sluggishness, loss of interest, loss of drive, fatigue, and depression. Gass and Ansley 
(1995) provide an overview of personality assessment of neurologically impaired 
patients, with findings that indicate a tendency toward elevations of scales 1, 2, 3, 7, and 
8, or Hypochondriasis, Depression, Hysteria, Psychasthenia, and Schizophrenia, 
respectively. However, other evidence demonstrates that there is likely no consistent 
“head injury” profile on the MMPI-2. For example, Alfano et al (1992) found that a wide
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variety of two-point eodes, eneompassing virtually all elinieal scales, have been found for 
head injury patients, and Bomstein et al. (1988) reported that signifieant elevations ean 
oeeur on virtually any elinieal scale for various subgroups of head injury patients.
The MMPI-2 must also be considered in light of neurological content, such that 
accurate responses by neurologieal patients might make their MMPI-2 profile appear 
more psyehopathologieal than is aetually the ease. Seales 1, 2, 3, 7, and 8 have the 
highest number of neurologically related items, but deleting these items would likely 
underestimate psychopathology (Gass & Russell, 1991). Additionally, eorreetion for 
neurologieal eontent may obseure possible psychological issues in a patient group where 
sueh faetors could be making an important eontribution to the overall picture.
The possibility of response sets on the MMPI-2 is also important when assessing for 
malingering. Response sets are present when a test-taker produees answers that are not 
meaningfully related to questions or are distorted in some important way. Two major 
categories of response sets exist (Nichols, Greene, & Schmolek, 1989). Content 
nonresponsiveness (CNR) is present when answers bear no meaningful relationship to 
questions (e.g., omitted, double-marked, or random responses). Content responsive 
faking (CRT) oeeurs when a test-taker distorts responses based on the eontent of the 
questions (e.g., under- or overreporting of psychopathology).
There is signifieant empirieal literature on the faking of head injury symptoms on the 
MMPI and MMPI-2 (e.g., Butcher, Arbisi, Atlis, & McNulty, 2003; Greififenstein et al., 
2004; Lairabee, 1998; Berry & Butcher, 1998). Basically, MMPI measures contain a 
number of scales that are sensitive to the overreporting of psyehological symptoms. The 
F scale is considered to be the best, followed by the F-K, Ds/Ds2, and F(b) seales (Ben-
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Porath, Graham, Hall, Hirschman, & Zaragoza, 1995). There is some support for the 
newer F(p) and FBS scales as well (Berry & Butcher, 1998). Analog studies suggest that 
those who are faking and/or potentially exaggerating the symptoms of head injury tend to 
show elevated MMPI-2 overreporting symptom scales (Berry & Butcher, 1998). For 
example, F scale t-scores in the 80’s would raise concern about overreporting; t-scores in 
the 90’s and above indicate the need for special attention to the possibility of 
overreported symptoms. Interestingly, studies of mild head injury patients with strong 
evidence of malingering cognitive deficits indicate that only a subset also overreports 
psychological symptoms; thus, the faking of cognitive deficits and psychological 
symptoms may be independent in those malingering head injury (Berry & Butcher,
1998).
The F scale, which was originally on the MMPI, consists o f 64 items selected because 
of low endorsement rates among the normative sample (Berry & Butcher, 1998). This 
scale has remained mostly the same on the MMPI-2. These items were selected to 
represent a wide variety of problems and content areas so that those reporting actual 
psychological distress would be unlikely to endorse more than a few of these items 
(Dahlstrom, Welsh, & Dahlstrom, 1972). Most of the MMPI-2 validity scales, like the F 
scale, are sensitive to content nonresponsiveness and to random reporting.
Another index on the MMPI-2 that is used for detecting response sets is the F-K 
index. Rogers, Sewell, and Salekin (1994) conducted a meta-analysis of 15 studies 
investigating the detection of malingering on the MMPI-2 and found continued support 
for the F and F-K scales. Support was also found for the F(b) scale. These results
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indicate that there is support for the use of the traditional seales, F and F-K, as well as 
promising support for the F(b) scale in the detection of malingering.
Since the MMPI-2 is the most widely utilized symptom report scale in forensic 
neuropsychology, there is utility in further examining the ability of its specific seales at 
detecting malingering. One of these seales is the Fake Bad Seale (FBS; Lee-Haley, 
English, & Glenn, 1991). As this is a newer scale on the MMPI-2, there is preliminary 
evidence, sueh as that described above, that this scale shows promising ability in the 
assessment of malingering. However, there is still mueh research to be done in 
determining the strengths and weaknesses of the Fake Bad Seale.
The Fake Bad Seale of the MMPI-2
Although the Fake Bad Scale was originally designed to deteet malingering in 
personal injury cases, it appears to be better at indicating invalid response styles in 
somatic injury eases, including brain injury cases, without assuming we know why an 
individual is exaggerating (Lees-Haley, 1997). For example, Larrabee (1997) suggested 
that “somatic malingering should be considered whenever elevations on seales 1 and 3 
[on the MMPI-2] exceed T=80, accompanied by a significant elevation on the FBS (p. 
203).” The Fake Bad Scale consists of 43 items, which were selected on the basis of their 
content (Lees-Haley et al., 1991). This scale was constructed utilizing rational as well as 
empirical strategies, similarly to the way the MMPI-2 itself was constructed 
(Greiffenstein et al., 2002). The original validation sample consisted of individuals who 
were suspected of malingering, individuals who were instructed to feign symptoms, and 
individuals believed to be suffering from actual head injuries. In this study, Lees-Haley 
(1991) suggested a cutoff score of 20 to be indicative of malingering, and obtained
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accurate classification of malingerers 96% of the time, for true patients 93% of the time, 
and for those instructed to feign symptoms 74% of the time. It was also found that 
malingerers and those instructed to fake usually answered the true-false items on the FBS 
in the opposite manner than those with actual head injuries, normal controls, and 
psychiatric controls. A later study done by Lees-Haley (1992) found that the 
FBS is also useful for detecting those who are malingering posttraumatic stress disorder, 
although it is necessary to utilize higher cutoff scores for this population. In fact, the 
cutoff scores found in this study of 24 for males and 26 for females are now widely 
accepted as the cutoff scores for malingering across populations (Larrabee, 1998).
As stated previously, the Fake Bad Scale was constructed in much the same way that 
the overall MMPI-2 was constructed. The development of this scale was based upon 
malingerer response patterns that include a tendency toward: “(1) appearing honest; (2) 
appearing psychologically normal except for the influence of the alleged cause of injury; 
(3) avoiding admitting preexisting psychopathology; (4) attempting to minimize the 
impact of previously disclosed preexisting complaints; (5) minimizing or hiding preinjury 
antisocial or illegal behavior; and (6) presenting a degree of injury or disability within the 
perceived limits of plausibility (Larrabee, 2003b, p. 55).”
The scoring of the Fake Bad Scale ranges fi'om 0 to 43, with 18 items scored in the 
“True” direction and 25 items scored in the “False” direction (Larrabee, 2003b). The 
majority of the items on this scale are fiom the Hypochondriasis and Hysteria clinical 
scales. Additionally, there are six items fiom the Schizophrenia clinical scale, four items 
each from the F scale, the Depression clinical scale, and the Paranoia clinical scale, three 
items each fiom the Psychasthenia and Social Introversion clinical scales, two items fiom
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the Psychopathie Deviate clinical scale, and one item each from the L and K seales 
(Larrabee, 2003b).
Martens, Donders, and Millis (2001) and Miller and Donders (2001) have also 
examined the accuracy o f the Fake Bad Scale; however, this research was done in the 
context of determining the base rate of invalid response sets. According to Miller and 
Donders (2001), Fake Bad Scale scores were elevated in 4% of individuals with moderate 
to severe traumatic head injury, in 30% of those with mild traumatic head injuries 
without financial incentives, and in 50% of those with mild traumatic head injury who 
were either involved in personal injury litigation or had filed for permanent complete 
disability. Furthermore, Miller and Donders (2001) state “This subscale [FBS] consists 
of MMPI-2 items that were selected for content on the basis of frequent counts of 
endorsements in personal injury claimants. The FBS has demonstrated potential 
sensitivity to exaggerated cognitive, emotional, or somatic distress in several recent 
investigations with individuals in personal litigation...” (p.298). Martens and colleagues 
(2001) found similar evidence when using the FBS criteria in a clinical sample, with 22% 
of these individuals having invalid response sets. Both of these data are consistent with 
previously reported base rates of invalid response sets.
There have been numerous studies that compare the Fake Bad Scale of the MMPI-2 
to other validity seales of this measure. Dearth et al. (2004) addressed this issue by 
comparing individuals with moderate to severe head injuries to community volunteers 
who were either instructed to fake symptoms or to answer honestly during an analog 
forensic neuropsyehologieal evaluation. The intent was to determine the possible 
eontribution of the MMPI-2 validity seales to identifying malingerers during
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neuropsychological evaluations. Most of the validity seales were found to have perfect 
speeifieity rates, but low to moderate sensitivity. The Fake Bad Seale, however, had both 
moderate speeifieity and moderate sensitivity. While these authors did find the Fake Bad 
Scale to be superior over other seales at the detection of malingering in 
neuropsyehologieal examination, this superiority was not as dramatic as in other studies. 
A potential explanation for this finding is the study design, which involved simulated 
malingering in an analog forensic neuropsyehologieal evaluation rather than actual 
suspected malingerers in actual neuropsyehologieal testing situations.
Fox, Gerson, and Lees-Haley (1995) also examined the various validity scales of the 
MMPI-2 in order to determine how well they fare in personal injury cases; in particular 
the purpose was to determine how sensitive the validity seales are in these cases. The 
authors found that the Fake Bad Seale may be sensitive to various aspects of malingering 
that are not measured by traditional MMPI-2 validity seales. Furthermore, the FBS may 
not measure malingering as it is traditionally defined by the DSM-IV, which only 
involves faking bad. It appears, based upon this study, that in personal injury eases 
malingering may involve a mixture of both faking bad and faking good. Thus, the 
authors make the argument that the Fake Bad Seale is particularly useful in the detection 
of malingering in personal injury claims, which is the original intent of the scale. 
Greiffenstein et al. (2002) concur with these findings by defining the purpose of the Fake 
Bad Seale as being to “deteet the simulation o f emotional distress in the context of 
compensation seeking (p. 1591)” and by finding the Fake Bad Seale to be superior to 
traditional MMPI-2 seales in the detection of malingering.
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Larrabee (2003a) examined the overall MMPI-2 profiles of individuals vyho vyere 
identified as meeting criteria for definite malingered neuroeognitive dysfunction in 
comparison to the MMPI-2 profiles of individuals who suffered from either moderate or 
severe closed head injury. His findings indicated that the Fake Bad Seale was the most 
sensitive scale in differentiating those who were malingering from those who had 
suffered a head injury. Additionally, signifieant differences were found between these 
two groups on the Hypochondriasis, Depression, Hysteria, Psychasthenia, and 
Schizophrenia seales of the MMPI-2.
Tsushima and Tsushima (2001) also found support for the Fake Bad Seale in 
comparison to other MMPI-2 validity seales in terms of its discriminatory power. The 
authors found that the FB A had significantly better discriminatory power with regard to 
differentiating between personal injury litigants, elinieal patients, and normal controls 
than the other MMPI-2 validity seales. More speeifieally, it was determined that the 
litigants and elinieal patients had higher Fake Bad Seale scores than the normal controls. 
Additionally, the FBS may be able to deteet somatic overreporting more accurately 
because it is sensitive to symptom exaggeration.
In comparison to the F scale, the Fake Bad Scale has been found in at least one study 
done by Larrabee (1998) to be superior at detecting malingering of head injuries. This 
study found that only 3 out of 12 litigating participants who were also suspected of 
malingering had elevations on the F scale while II of 12 of these individuals had 
elevations of the Fake Bad Seale. However, Larrabee (1998) utilized the higher cutoff 
scores of 24 for males and 26 for females based upon the earlier suggestion of these 
cutoffs by Lees-Haley (1992) for the detection of malingered PTSD. The use of these
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higher eutoff scores was a response to the fact that there is considerable overlap between 
the Fake Bad Scale, the Hypochondriasis scale, and the Hysteria scale of the MMPI-2.
Larrabee (2003b) also examined the accuracy of the Fake Bad Scale in comparison to 
other standard neuropsyehologieal tests in terms of detecting malingering. He identified 
cut-off scores that defined clinically atypical patterns of performance on five standard 
neuropsychological tests, including the Benton Visual Form Discrimination Test, 
Fingertapping, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised Reliable Digit Span, the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Failure-to-Maintain Set, and the Lees-Haley Fake Bad Seale 
from the MMPI-2. All possible pair-wise combinations of scores beyond the eut-off 
scores were considered. These pair-wise combinations correctly identified 87.5% of 
those meeting criteria for definite malingered neuroeognitive dysfunction and 88.9% of 
those with moderate to severe closed head injury. Furthermore, on cross-validation 
88.2% of those meeting criteria for probably malingered neuroeognitive dysfunction were 
correctly identified, with 13 of 13 non-litigating neurologic patients and 14 of 14 non­
litigating psychiatric patients correctly identified as having motivationally-preserved 
performance. Taken together, the samples result in a sensitivity of 87.8%, a specificity of 
94.4%, and a combined ‘hit-rate’ of 91.6%. Slick, Hopp, Strauss, and Spellacy (1996) 
also compared the Fake Bad Scale o f the MMPI-2 to other neuropsychological tests and 
other MMPI-2 validity seales. These authors found that the FBS correlates with other 
tests of malingering, sueh as the Portland Digit Recognition Test and the Victoria 
Symptom Validity Test. Specifically, it was indicated that the FBS correlated higher 
with the Victoria Symptom Validity Test than did other MMPI-2 scales, including the F, 
F-K, F(p), and 0-S indices.
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Ross, Millis, Kmkowski, Putnam, and Adams (2004) also found support for the use 
of the Fake Bad Scale to detect malingering of head injuries. These investigators utilized 
a cutoff score of 21 and successfully identified 90% of litigating mild head injury cases 
and 90% of actual head injury patients. Ross et al. (2004) also examined the overlap of 
the Fake Bad Scale and the Hysteria and Hypochondriasis Scales. They found that 
although the Fake Bad, the Hysteria, and the Hypochondriasis Scales were related, the 
FBS carried the majority of the variance in detecting malingering. Thus, “these results 
suggest that the FBS, and the construct that it represents, are more indicative of invalid 
responding rather than somatoform disorder (Ross et al., 2004, p. 122).”
Taken together these data indicate that the Fake Bad Scale of the MMPI-2 is 
potentially effective at detecting somatic malingering. However, there is little evidence 
that the Fake Bad Scale is successful at differentiating between an actual head injury, a 
somatization disorder, and malingering. Several studies stated that the Fake Bad Scale is 
weighted heavily in the direction of somatic complaints leaving it open to the criticism 
that it may not be an accurate tool for making the differentiation between these 
possibilities. Thus, further research must be done in this area in order to determine the 
ability of the FBS to make these differentiations, particularly among personal injury 
litigants.
Present Research
The present study will expand upon previous research regarding the efficacy of the 
Fake Bad Scale for detecting the malingering of head injuries. In particular, this study 
will focus on a similar question to that addressed by Ross et al. (2004) regarding the
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efficacy of the FBS in differentiating malingering and somatization disorders. 
Specifically, the research aims to use established comprehensive medical and 
neuropsyehologieal records to differentiate between individuals who aetually have 
sustained a head injury from those who have been determined to have a somatoform 
disorder or individuals who have been determined to be malingering as indicated by these 
comprehensive medical and neuropsyehologieal records. In so doing, special attention 
will be given to the items contributing to the FBS for those diagnosed as having a 
somatization disorder.
The research is guided by the following hypotheses:
1. That the FBS will successfully differentiate between individuals who have a 
traumatic brain injury and individuals who are malingering as well as between 
individuals who have a traumatic brain injury and those with a somatoform 
disorder, but will less successfully differentiate between individuals who have a 
somatoform disorder and those who are malingering.
2. The FBS will be comparable to other MMPI-2 validity scales and to the Portland 
Digit Recognition Test and the Test of Memory Malingering in its ability to 
differentiate between individuals who have a traumatic brain injury and those who 
are malingering as well as between those with a traumatic brain injury and 
individuals with a somatoform disorder, but will be less successful than these 
other measures at differentiating between individuals with a somatoform disorder 
and those who are malingering.
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3. That there will not he gender differences in the Fake Bad Scale’s ahility to 
differentiate between individuals with traumatic hrain injuiy, individuals with a 
somatoform disorder, and individuals who are malingering.
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CHAPTER 3
METHOD 
Participant Data Set
The participant sample consisted of the neuropsychological records o f 283 individuals 
who were involved in either a personal injury or workman’s compensation lawsuit who 
were diagnosed by a licensed psychologist in a private neuropsychology practice. Each 
participant had been administered a combination of the following psychological and 
neuropsychological assessments as was deemed appropriate by their presenting 
complaint: Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-Ill, Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory-2, Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised, Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale-Ill, Wechsler Memory Scale-Ill, Wide Range Achievement Test-3, Grip Strength, 
Manual Finger Tapping Test, Grooved Pegboard Test, Reitan Klove Sensory Perceptual 
Examination, Tactile Finger Recognition, Tactile Form Recognition, Fingertip Number 
Writing, Tactual Performance Test, Trails A and B, Short Category Test, Boston Naming 
Test, Stroop Color Word Test, Letter and Category Fluency tests. Test of Memory 
Malingering, Beck Anxiety Inventory, Portland Digit Recognition, Adult DSM-IV 
Symptom Checklist, Significant Life Events Questioimaire, California Verbal Learning 
Test, and Lateral Dominance Examination.
Each participant had also undergone an extensive clinical interview, the notes from 
which were contained in their records. Additionally, complete medical records were also
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available for these participants and were reviewed by the investigator for those individual 
participants with presenting eomplaints that warranted such a review.
The diagnoses represented in this participant sample included the following: Major 
Depressive Disorder, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Panic Disorder, Substance 
Dependenee, Pain Disorder, Avoidant Personality Disorder, Borderline Personality 
Disorder, Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Conversion Disorder, Hypochondriasis,
Schizoid Personality Disorder, Histrionic Personality Disorder, Adjustment Disorders 
with Mixed Anxiety and Depressive Mood, Undifferentiated Somatoform Disorder, 
Dementia due to Closed Head Injury, Personality Change due to Closed Head Injury, 
Dysthymie Disorder, Traumatic Brain Injury, and Malingering. The diagnosis of 
malingering was made utilizing the Slick, Sherman, and Iverson (1999) criteria 
previously described. For the purposes of this research, only individuals who received a 
diagnosis of definite malingering were included in the sample.
Of the 283 participant records in this sample, 30 had a diagnosis of definite 
malingering, 31 had a diagnosis of a pure somatoform disorder, and 21 had a diagnosis of 
a traumatic brain injury for a total of 82 participant records whose diagnoses were 
pertinent to the present research. A power analysis conducted utilizing F-power from 
SAS indicated that, for a moderate effect size of .75 utilizing a one-way ANOVA, a 
sample of 30 partieipants in each of the three groups of interest would provide a power of 
.726.
The remaining 201 participants in the overall record sample had either a diagnosis 
that was not pertinent to this study or had multiple “rule out” diagnoses that may have 
included the three of interest in this study. Individuals who did not have a pure diagnosis
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of malingering, a somatoform diagnosis, or traumatic brain injury were not considered in 
the final analyses. There were 12 additional individuals who were diagnosed with 
traumatic brain injury who were not actually tested in the private practice where the data 
were collected; these individuals’ medieal and psychological records were simply 
submitted for a record review. None of these cases was considered in the final participant 
sample of 82 participants. Lastly, there were 7 records from the overall participant 
sample that fit the diagnostic criteria for this study but were missing pertinent 
information (e.g., MMPI-2 answers were missing preventing a Fake Bad Scale score 
from being calculated). These records were also not considered in the final participant 
sample.
Of the 82 participants whose reeords were considered further in the research, 38 were 
female and 44 were male. The age range for the research sample was 18 to 71 years of 
age, with a mean age of 42.48 and a standard deviation of 10.56. The ethnic breakdown 
of the sample was as follows: 8 African American (9.75%), 2 Asian/Pacific Islander 
(2.43%), 62 Caucasian (75.60%), 7 Hispanic (8.53%), and 3 Other (3.65%). The ethnic 
breakdown was determined by patient self-report. The category of Other included 
individuals who identified themselves by specific country of origin; one individual in that 
group self-identified as Lebanese, another self-identified as Iranian, and the third self­
identified as Hungarian.
Procedure
The study evaluated and eompared the Fake Bad Scale scores of the MMPI-2 for the 
research sample of 82 individuals in order to determine whether the Fake Bad Scale
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accurately differentiated among traumatic brain injuiy ( N= 21), somatoform disorder ( 
N=31), and malingering patients (N=30). It was of particular interest to examine the 
Fake Bad Scale Scores of those individuals diagnosed with a somatoform disorder since 
prior research indicated that the Fake Bad Scale may be heavily weighted toward somatic 
complaints.
This study further compared the Fake Bad Scale to measures of infrequent responding 
on the MMPI-2, as well as to the Portland Digit Recognition Test (Binder, 1993), and the 
Test of Memory Malingering (Tombaugh, 2002). The power of the Fake Bad Scale to 
differentiate among traumatic brain injuiy, somatoform disorder and malingering was 
also examined with regard to gender differences.
Each of the 82 individual reeords were examined by the researcher and summarized 
in a written report that included demographic information, background information 
regarding the participant’s circumstances, including medical evidence, 
neuropsychological and psychological test results, and diagnosis. Redacted examples of 
these reports can be found in Appendix A. Any data that were not already numeric was 
coded by the researcher for purposes of further statistical analyses.
The coding system for gender was I for male and 2 for female. The coding system 
for ethnicity was I for African American, 2 for Asian/Pacific Islander, 3 for Caucasian, 4 
for Hispanic, and 5 for Other. Medical evidence was coded as 0 if there was little to no 
medical evidence to support a claim of injuiy by the participant; this included negative 
neuroimaging (e.g., no positive CT Scans, no positive MRIs) and a normal Glasgow 
Coma Scale Score. Medical evidence was coded as I if there was substantial medical 
evidence to support a participant’s injuiy claim; this included positive neuroimaging
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(e.g., one or more positive CT Scans, one or more positive MRIs) and an impaired 
Glasgow Coma Scale Seore.
The coding of medical evidence, as well as the inelusion of only those individuals 
with a diagnosis of definite malingering or a pure somatoform disorder, were utilized as a 
means of establishing a level of inter-rater reliability. There were no discrepancies 
between the present investigator’s coding of medical evidence and that of the elinieian 
who initially assigned the diagnoses to the partieipants. Similarly, a Glasgow Coma 
Seale Seore of 12 or lower (Bigler & Clement, 1997) was considered to be impaired by 
the present investigator. Again, based upon this there were no discrepancies between the 
present investigator and the elinieian who initially assigned the diagnoses to the 
partieipants.
Lastly, in terms of coding, scores on the Portland Digit Recognition Test were coded 
as 1 or 0. A code of 1 indicated that the participant fell below the eut-off seore for 
malingering, which indicated suboptimal effort. A code of 0 indicated that the participant 
fell above the eut-off seore for malingering, which indicated that the participant put forth 
optimal effort on that particular measure. This latter coding was necessitated because 
some partieipants were given an abbreviated version of the Portland Digit Recognition 
Test while others were given the full version, resulting in different cut-off scores. The 
eut-off seore for malingering for the 27-item version of the Portland Digit Recognition 
Test is 15 and the cut-off seore for malingering for the 72-item version of the Portland 
Digit Recognition Test is 39.
Each of the previously articulated hypotheses was considered using the data 
extracted from the records and analyzed statistically using SPSS. A consideration of the
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approaches used to address these hypotheses is given next. The FBS was primarily 
examined in order to determine how well it differentiated among participants with a 
traumatic brain injury, with a somatoform or other psychological disorder, and 
participants who were malingering. It was hypothesized that the Fake Bad Scale would 
successfully differentiate between participants with traumatic brain injuries and those 
who were malingering and between participants with traumatic brain injury and those 
who had a somatoform disorder, but that the FBS would be less successful in 
differentiating between participants who were malingering and those who had a 
somatoform disorder. In order to address these hypotheses, the sensitivity and specificity 
of the Fake Bad Scale were evaluated. Sensitivity indicated the proportion of confirmed 
malingering participants, or those who were above the established cut-off scores for 
malingering, that were correctly identified by the Fake Bad Scale. Specificity indicated 
the proportion of non-malingering participants, or those who were below the established 
cut-off scores for malingering, that were correctly identified by the Fake Bad Scale. A 
one-way ANOVA was conducted to evaluate the differences among these three groups.
A Bonferroni Comparison was made post hoc.
Next, the Fake Bad Scale of the MMPI-2 was compared to the F scale, the F-K 
index, and the F(b) scales of the MMPI as well as to the Test of Memory Malingering and 
the Portland Digit Recognition Test in order to determine how well each of these scales 
differentiated among those with traumatic brain injuries, those with somatoform 
disorders, and those who were malingering. The relevant hypothesis here was that the 
Fake Bad Scale would be comparable to other MMPI-2 validity scales, and to the other 
measures of malingering used, when differentiating between TBI and malingering as well
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as between TBI and somatoform disorders. On the other hand, it was hypothesized that 
the FBS would be less successfiil than the other MMPI-2 validity scales, and the other 
measures of malingering used, at differentiating between somatoform disorders and 
malingering. These hypotheses were statistically analyzed using a one-way ANOVA and 
posthoc Bonferroni comparisons. Additionally, correlations between the obtained Fake 
Bad Scale, the F scale, the F-K index, and the F(b) scale score were examined, as was the 
percentage of item overlap that occurred between each validity scale, in order to address 
the issue of colinearity. Statistical comparisons were not conducted for the Test of 
Memory Malingering or for the Portland Digit Recognition Test due to the unexpectedly 
small numbers of participants who were administered these measures.
The final research question considered was whether there were gender differences 
with respect to how well the Fake Bad Scale of the MMPI-2 differentiated among those 
participants who had a traumatic brain injury, a somatoform disorder, or were 
malingering. This was evaluated statistically utilizing a one-way ANOVA. Significant 
differences were not hypothesized to occur due to the fact that the Fake Bad Scale utilizes 
gender specific cut-off scores of 24 for men and 26 for women.
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS
Prior to beginning the statistical analyses of the MMPI-2 validity scales, the 
scales were examined to determine the degree to which the items of each scale 
overlapped with the items of each other scale that was used in this research. This was 
done since if there were considerable overlap in items on the validity scales, one would 
necessarily expect that the individual scales would not show differences in the differential 
diagnosis of malingering simply due to item duplication on each scale.
The K Scale was considered, rather than the F-K Index, in analyzing item overlap 
because the F-K Index is a score that is obtained by subtracting the obtained raw score on 
the K Scale from the obtained raw score on the F Scale. Thus, there are no specific items 
on the F-K Index; it is the difference o f the scores obtained on two separate scales.
Table 1 presents the percentage of item overlap that occurs between each of the 
MMPI-2 validity scales, that is the percentage of items that appeared on multiple scales. 
As can be seen, there is minimal item overlap between the MMPI-2 validity scales that 
were considered in this study. All o f the scales have fewer than six per cent shared items. 
The greatest item overlap occurs between the Fake Bad Scale and the F and K scales, 
which themselves have an item overlap of slightly more than one per cent. The F(b) scale 
has zero item overlap with the F and K scales. Since the validity scales o f the MMPI-2
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generally have so few items in common with each other, the issue of collinearity among 
the scales compared herein was not considered as a factor of importance in this research.
Table 1: Percent tem Overlap Between MMPI-2 Validity Scales
Fake Bad Scale F Scale K Scale F(b) Scale
Fake Bad Scale 100% 4.85% 5.48% 1:20%
F Scale 100% 1.11% 0%
K Scale 100% 0%
F(b) Scale 100%
Inasmuch as each of the MMPI-2 scales considered in this research were 
constructed as validity scales, there was an a priori assumption made by the investigator 
that individuals’ scores on one validity scale would be predictive of their scores on the 
other validity scales. Said otherwise, if an individual produced an invalid profile on one 
validity scale, it was assumed that the other validity scales would reflect this type of 
performance as well.
So as to test this assumption, and as a preliminaiy manipulation check on the data 
to be used in the subsequent analyses, correlations among the obtained scores on the 
MMPI-2 validity scales were computed and are presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Pearson Correlations between MMPI-2 Validity Scale Scores
Fake Bad 
Scale
F Scale F-K Index F(b) Scale
Fake Bad 
Scale
1.000 .540** .350** .515**
F Scale 1.000 .741** .809**
F-K Index 1.000 .714**
F(b) Scale 1.000
**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
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As assumed, all of these correlations proved to be significant. However, the 
strongest correlations were obtained among the F Scale, F(b) Scale and K Scale. 
Significant but less robust correlations were obtained between these three validity scales 
and the Fake Bad Scale. This may be due to the fact that both the F Scale and the F(b) 
Scale consist of items that are not typically endorsed in normative samples, but are not 
necessarily associated with faking bad, while the K Scale tends to evaluate an 
individual’s level of defensiveness and ego strength rather than faking bad per se.(Steh, 
2007).
Turning next to the analyses of the actual scores obtained from the validity scales, 
starting with the FBS, Table 3 presents the mean, range, and standard deviation for the 
Fake Bad Scale scores obtained from the traumatic brain injury group, the somatoform 
disorder group, and the malingering group. As can be seen therein, the mean FBS scores 
were highest for the malingering group and lowest for the TBI group.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Fake Bad Scale Score
Mean Minimum Maximum Standard
Deviation
TBI 17.95 8 23 4.53
Somatoform 24.74 18 34 4.40
Malingering 28.23 15 43 5.83
Differences among these groups were relevant to the first research question of how 
well the Fake Bad Scale of the MMPI-2 differentiates among those with a traumatic brain 
injury, those with a somatoform disorder, and those who are malingering. Recall that it 
was expected that the Fake Bad Scale would successfully differentiate between those
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with traumatic brain injuries and those with somatoform disorders or those who were 
malingering. However, the FBS was not expected to differentiate well between those 
who had a somatoform disorder and those who were malingering.
Once again, these expectations were based upon the working assumption that the 
general public is typically quite misinformed regarding the sequelae of traumatic brain 
injury, and often believe that physical complaints are more common than psychological 
or cognitive complaints, particularly in cases of mild head injury. Thus, it follows that 
many malingerers would report more physical complaints than psychological, emotional, 
or cognitive complaints. The Fake Bad Scale of the MMPI-2 is heavily weighted with 
somatic complaints. While this may help to identify malingerers, it was thought that it 
may also increase the risk of falsely identifying those with a somatoform disorder as 
malingering.
In order to determine whether there was an overall statistically significant difference 
among the group means for the Fake Bad Scale score, and in order to determine if  further, 
pairwise comparisons were warranted, a one-way ANOVA was performed. This analysis 
yielded the following results: F(df = 2) = 26.177 (p < .001), which indicated that the 
mean differences in FBS score shown in Table I among the three groups were 
significantly different.
A post hoc Bonferroni comparison was subsequently used to further explore where 
between the groups significant score differences were obtained. All of the individual 
group comparisons were significantly different as may be seen in Table 4.
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Table 4: Bonferroni Comparison for MMPI-2 Fake Bad Scale Scores Between Groups
Mean Difference SE Sig.
FBS Malingering & 
Somatoform
3.49 1.28 .024
FBS Malingering & 
TBI
10.28 1.43 <.001
FBS Somatoform & 
TBI
6.79 1.42 <.001
As hypothesized, the Fake Bad Scale readily and powerfully (p < .001) differentiated 
between the traumatic brain injury group and the malingering and somatoform groups. 
However, contrary to expectation, the Fake Bad Scale also significantly differentiated, 
although less decisively (p=.024), between the malingering group and the somatoform 
group. This would suggest, then, that the Fake Bad Scale has utility in differentiating 
between malingerers and those with traumatic brain injury or somatoform disorder.
To explore further the differential diagnostic effectiveness of the Fake Bad Scale, the 
sensitivity and specificity of the Fake Bad Scale were calculated. Sensitivity is the 
percentage of malingerers that were correctly identified by the scale (that is, fell above 
the scale cut off for malingering). A scale is said to be sensitive to the extent that it 
correctly measures the construct it was designed to measure. On the other hand, a scale is 
said to have specificity to the extent that it differentiates between the construct intended 
for measure and other constructs. In other words, the Fake Bad Scale would be said to 
have specificity to the extent that nonmalingerers are correctly identified by the scale 
(that is, fell below  the scale cut o f f  for malingering). The sensitivity o f  the Fake Bad 
Scale was 76.67%, with 23 of 30 individuals diagnosed with malingering falling above 
the cut-off score for this scale.
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The overall specificity for the Fake Bad Scale, when considering individuals in both 
the somatoform disorder group and the traumatic brain injury group, was 69.23%, with 
36 of 52 non-malingerers falling below the cut-off score for this measure. However, 
when these two groups were considered separately, the specificity for the traumatic brain 
injury group was 100%, while for the somatoform disorder group the specificity of the 
scale was 48.38%. In this somatoform disorder group, 15 of 31 individuals obtained 
Fake Bad Scale scores that fell below the cut-off for malingering, which means that 16 of 
31 somatoform disordered individuals were diagnosed as malingering based upon their 
Fake Bad Scale scores.
Taken together the data obtained for the Fake Bad Scale suggested that based on 
group mean scores, the Fake Bad Scale appeared to be successfiil in differentiating 
among individuals who were malingering, had a somatoform disorder, or had a traumatic 
brain injury, while based on individual scores, the scale seems to effectively differentiate 
between malingerers and those with traumatic brain injury but falsely classifies 
individuals with somatoform disorders as malingering approximately 50 percent of the 
time.
The second research question examined how well the Fake Bad Scale of the MMPI-2 
differentiated among traumatic brain injury patients, those with somatoform disorders, 
and malingerers compared to other MMPI-2 validity scales, namely the F Scale, the F-K 
Index, and the F(b) Scale. Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for the MMPI-2 validity 
scales along with the data for the Fake Bad Scale previously presented in Table 3.
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Table 5 : Descriptive Statistics for MMPI-2 Validity Scales
F
Scale
Mean
F Scale 
Std. 
Deviation
F-K
Index
Mean
F-K Std. 
Deviation
F(b)
Scale
Mean
F(b) Std. 
Deviation
Fake
Bad
Scale
Mean
Fake Bad 
Scale 
Std. 
Deviation
TBI 56.76 10.93 -9.19 11.92 56.86 16.22 17.95 4.53
Somatoform 60.35 15.13 -9.19 11.17 56.55 15.81 24.74 4.40
Malingering 71.67 18.07 3.33
e-02
11.87 77.93 22.48 28.23 5.83
As can be seen from the table, on all four scales that were considered, the 
malingering groups had more elevated mean scores than either the somatoform or 
traumatic brain injury groups. Also of note is that for the F Scale, F-K Index and F(b) 
scales, the mean scores for the TBI and Somatoform groups were reasonably similar 
whereas for the Fake Bad Scale the malingering and somatoform group scores were more 
comparable than for the TBI group.
In order to determine whether any of these observed mean differences among the 
groups were significant for each scale, a separate one-way ANOVA was used to analyze 
each MMPI-2 validity scale. The results of these analyses are shown in Table 6 where it 
can be seen that the group differences for each validity scale were in fact significant. 
Thus, these results indicate that the MMPI-2 validity scales, like the Fake Bad Scale, 
successfully differentiated among the three diagnostic groups in terms of mean scores.
76
Table 6: One-Way ANQVAs for MMPI-2 Validity Scales
F(df=2) Significance Level
Fake Bad Scale 26.177 <.001
F Scale 6.881 .002
F-KIndex 5.993 .004
F(b) Scale 12.390 <.001
A subsequent Bonferroni Comparison was conducted as the results from the one­
way ANOVAs were statistically significant. These results are presented in Table 7.
Table 7: Bonferroni Comparisons for MMPl-2 Validity Scales
Mean Difference Süg.
FBS Malingering & 3.49 .024
Somatoform
FBS Malingering & TBI 10.28 <.001
FBS Somatoform & TBI 6.79 <.001
F Malingering & 11.31 .016
Somatoform
F Malingering & TBI 14.90 .003
F Somatoform & TBI 3.59 1.00
F-K Malingering & 9.23 .008
Somatoform
F-K Malingering & TBI 9.22 .020
F-K Somatoform & TBI 3.07 e-03 1.00
F(b) Malingering & 21.38 <.001
Somatoform
F(b) Malingering & TBI 21.088 <.001
F(b) Somatoform & TBI .31 1.00
As discussed previously (cf. Table 2) the Bonferroni Comparison indicated that 
the Fake Bad Scale significantly differentiated among individuals who were malingering, 
individuals with somatoform disorders, and individuals who had incurred a traumatic 
brain injury.
In contrast, the MMPl-2 F Scale, F-K Index and F(b) Scale differentiated 
significantly between individuals who were malingering and individuals with a
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somatoform disorder as well as between individuals who were malingering and those 
with a traumatic brain injury but did not significantly differentiate between individuals 
with a somatoform disorder and individuals with a traumatic brain injury.
Sensitivity and specificity was calculated for each of the MMPI-2 validity scales. 
This information is presented in Table 8.
Table 8: Sensitivity & Specificity for MMPI-2 Validity Scales.
Sensitivity
(Malingerers)
Specificity 
(Somatoform D/O)
Specificity
(TBI)
FBS 76.67% 48.38% 100%
F Scale 63.33% 67.74% 80.95%
F-K Index 16.67% 93.55% 95.24%
F(b) Scale 73.33% 70.97% 71.43%
Again, sensitivity represents the number of malingerers who were correctly 
classified by the scale based upon clinical cut-off scores for malingering while specificity 
represents the number of non-malingerers who fell below the clinical cut-off scores for 
malingering for each validity scale. As was the case above for the Fake Bad Score, these 
data again demonstrate that significant differences in mean scores on a particular scale do 
not necessarily indicate that a particular scale has classified an individual correctly by 
diagnosis.
The data in Table 8 indicate that, in terms of simple percentages of correct 
classifications, the Fake Bad Scale successfully classified individuals who were 
malingering and individuals with traumatic brain injuries more fi-equently than the other 
three validity scales. However, again in terms of simple percentage of correct 
classifications, the Fake Bad Scale successfully classified individuals with somatoform
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disorders less frequently than the other MMPI-2 validity scales. Thus, while the Fake 
Bad Scale may be effective in differentiating between individuals who are malingering 
and those with a traumatic brain injury as well as between those with a somatoform 
disorder and those with a traumatic brain injury, when there is a question of whether an 
individual is malingering or has a somatoform disorder the Fake Bad Scale may not be 
specific in making this distinction.
The F Scale of the MMPI-2 successfully classified those who were malingering 
63.33% of the time, those with a somatoform disorder 67.74% of the time, and those with 
a traumatic brain injury 80.95% of the time. Combined with the results from the 
Bonferroni comparison, which demonstrated that the F Scale does not successfully 
differentiate between the mean scores of individuals with a traumatic brain injury and 
those with a somatoform disorder, these percentages likely indicate that, at least some of 
the time, individuals with a somatoform disorder are being falsely classified as having a 
traumatic brain injury and vice versa. It appears less likely that this scale is falsely 
classifying individuals who have a somatoform disorder or a traumatic brain injury as 
malingering or that those who are malingering are being classified as having a 
somatoform disorder or traumatic brain injury, but this is still a possibility with the F 
Scale given the modest nature of the percentages of correct classifications.
The F-K Index of the MMPI-2 correctly classified individuals diagnosed as 
malingering only 16.67% of the time. However, it correctly classified those with 
somatoform disorders 93.55% of the time and those with a traumatic brain injury 95.24% 
of the time. This indicates that this particular scale may be falsely classifying 
malingerers as having either a somatoform disorder or a traumatic brain injury such that
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they do not show significant differences in their mean scores. However, it is unlikely that 
the F-K Index is falsely classifying those with a somatoform disorder or a traumatic brain 
injury.
Lastly, the F(b) Scale correctly identified individuals who were malingering 
73.33% of the time, individuals with a somatoform disorder 70.97% of the time, and 
individuals with a traumatic brain injury 71.43% of the time. Like all of the MMPI-2 
validity scales examined, with the exception of the Fake Bad Scale, this scale found 
overall differences in the mean scores of malingerers and those with a somatoform 
disorder and in the scores of malingerers and those with a traumatic brain injury but did 
not find overall differences in the scores of individuals with a somatoform disorder 
compared to those with a traumatic brain injury. Thus, it is possible that this validity 
scale could also incorrectly classify those with a somatoform disorder as having a 
traumatic brain injury and vice versa, but it is unlikely that this validity scale classifies 
either of these groups as malingerers or classifies malingerers as either of the other two 
diagnostic groups.
Another aspect of the second research question concerned the TOMM. When 
compared to the TOMM, the Fake Bad Scale of the MMPI-2 was thought likely to do at 
least as well at detecting malingering and likely to be less successful at differentiating 
among those with somatoform disorders and malingerers. This was predicted because the 
TOMM specifically tests for memory, not somatic, malingering. Thus, the TOMM 
would likely not produce false positives for those with somatoform disorders. 
Unfortunately, an unexpectedly small number of participants (N = 18) were administered 
the TOMM. This number was even smaller when only pure somatic and pure memory
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malingerers were considered (N = 2) rather than individuals who had a combined 
malingering diagnosis. Therefore, meaningful statistics could not be calculated for this 
measure.
The final aspect o f the second research question concerned the Portland Digit 
Recognition Test (PDRT). With regard to this measure, which like the TOMM is not 
specific to somatic malingering, it was hypothesized that the Fake Bad Scale of the 
MMPI-2 would be likely to perform at least as well as the Portland Digit Recognition 
Test at detecting malingering and likely to be less successful at differentiating between 
those with somatoform disorders and malingerers. Again, it would be unlikely that the 
PDRT would produce false positives for those with somatoform disorders.
As was the case for the TOMM, a very small number of the participants were 
administered the PDRT (N -  28). This small number of participants was further 
complicated by the fact that two-different versions (Short and Long) of the PDRT were 
utilized by the clinician who administered the assessment batteries. Therefore, means 
and standard deviations were not calculated for the PDRT but instead, these data were 
coded for either being suggestive or not suggestive of malingering.
Of the 28 participants who were administered this measure, 16 were diagnosed as 
malingerers. All 16 participants scored above the respective cut-off scores for 
malingering on either the short or the long version of the PDRT. There were seven 
individuals in the somatoform disorder group who were administered the Portland Digit 
Recognition Test, with one individual scoring above the cut-off for malingering. Lastly, 
in the traumatic brain injury group, five individuals were administered this measure, and 
two fell above the cut-off score for malingering. While no statistical analyses were
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performed on these data, and any generalizations made from them are tenuous at best, the 
number of individuals falling above the cut-off score for malingering in each group 
suggested that the PDRT may be unlikely to falsely classify individuals with somatoform 
disorders as malingering. However, the PDRT may not be useful in detecting traumatic 
brain injury given that nearly half o f the TBI patients who were administered this 
measure fell above the cut-off score for malingering.
With regard to the final research question of whether there were gender differences in 
how well the Fake Bad Scale of the MMPI-2 differentiates among those with traumatic 
brain injuries, those with somatoform disorders, and those who are malingering; it was 
thought to be unlikely that gender differences would be found. There are different 
accepted cut-off scores for this scale for men and women based upon the fact that there 
are gender differences in the experience and prevalence of many of the somatoform 
disorders. However, since the comparison of the three groups in question had not been 
previously made, the possibility o f gender differences was examined. Gender differences 
were calculated for the overall sample as well as for each of the three groups of interest 
utilizing ANOVA. As expected, there were no significant differences with regard to 
gender for the overall sample or for any of the individual groups of interest as is shown in 
Table 9.
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Table 9: Gender Comparisons for Fake 3ad Scale
F Significance
Fake Bad Scale for All 
Groups
.281 .598
Fake Bad Scale for 
Malingering Group
.114 .738
Fake Bad Scale for 
Somatoform Group
.547 .466
Fake Bad Scale for 
Traumatic Brain Injury 
Group
.107 .747
83
CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
The impetus for this research lies in the fact that the diagnosis of malingering can 
be a complex and difficult process. While nearly any psychological, neurological, or 
physical complaint can be malingered, the present research focused on the malingering of 
somatic complaints. Malingering of somatic complaints is specifically relevant to the 
malingering of traumatic brain injuries inasmuch as most traumatic brain injury 
malingerers are typically not well educated regarding the actual sequelae of traumatic 
brain injury and fi’equently incorrectly assume that multiple somatic complaints are 
associated with a traumatic brain injury (Gouvier, Prestholdt, & Warner, 1988; Wilier, 
Johnson, Rempel, & Linn, 1993).
One measure that has been designed specifically to assess the presence of somatic 
malingering, particularly among personal injury litigants, is the Fake Bad Scale of the 
MMPI-2. The present research was designed to examine the power of the Fake Bad 
Scale in terms of differentiating between individuals who had been previously diagnosed 
with malingering, those who had been previously diagnosed with a somatoform disorder, 
and individuals who had previously been diagnosed as having incurred a traumatic brain 
injury.
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By way of overall summary of the obtained results, the present research found 
that the Fake Bad Scale successfully differentiated between individuals who were 
malingering, those who had a diagnosed somatoform disorder, and those who had 
incurred a traumatic brain injury. In fact, the Fake Bad Scale also successfully 
differentiated among all possible paired comparisons of these three groups. However, 
when sensitivity and specificity were considered, it became clear that Fake Bad Scale 
scores should be interpreted with care when it is a possibility that an individual may have 
a somatoform disorder as individuals with this disorder were actually correctly classified 
less than 50 percent of the time.
Furthermore, it was found that the Fake Bad Scale is comparable to other MMPI- 
2 validity scales when differentiating among individuals who are malingering, individuals 
with a somatoform disorder, and individuals with a traumatic brain injury. The F Scale, 
the F-K Index, and the F(b) Scale were considered along with the Fake Bad Scale, and it 
was found that all of these scales successfully differentiated among the three groups of 
interest. However, when individual paired comparisons were made, only the Fake Bad 
Scale successfully differentiated between individuals with a somatoform disorder and 
individuals with a traumatic brain injury.
It was hypothesized that the Fake Bad Scale would successfully differentiate 
between individuals who were malingering and individuals with a traumatic brain injury 
as well as between individuals who had a somatoform disorder and those with a traumatic 
brain injury but that the Fake Bad Scale would be less successful at differentiating 
between individuals who were malingering and individuals diagnosed with a somatoform 
disorder. This hypothesis was based upon the afore mentioned research that indicates
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that individuals frequently incorrectly assume that multiple somatic complaints are 
associated with a traumatic brain injury (Gouvier, Prestholdt, & Warner, 1988; Wilier, 
Johnson, Rempel, & Linn, 1993) and the fact that the Fake Bad Sale is heavily weighted 
with somatic complaints because it is comprised of mainly items from the 
Hypochondriasis and Hysteria clinical scales of the MMPI-2 (Groth-Mamat, 1999).
Contrary to prediction, the data obtained in this research indicated that the Fake 
Bad Scale successfully differentiated among all three diagnostic groups both in terms of 
overall mean scores and pairwise comparisons among the groups.
However, in terms of sensitivity and specificity, the Fake Bad Scale for the most 
part correctly classified malingerers, correctly classified those with traumatic brain 
injuries 100 percent of the time but correctly classified those with a somatoform disorder 
less than 50 percent of the time. Obviously, when the Fake Bad Scale is utilized in 
clinical practice to diagnose malingering, clinicians should carefully consider that this 
scale has the potential to falsely classify somatoform disorders as malingerers 
approximately 50 percent of the time.
The present research is only somewhat consistent with prior research regarding 
the sensitivity and specificity of the Fake Bad Scale, and, in general, provided less 
support for the utility of the Fake Bad Scale in the detection of malingering versus 
traumatic brain injury. For example, Lees-Haley (1991) found that the Fake Bad Scale 
correctly classified individuals as malingering 96 percent of the time and correctly 
identified those with a traumatic brain injury 93 percent of the time. Prior research done 
by Miller and Donders (2001) and Martens et al. (2001) found lower rates of specificity 
for the Fake Bad Scale. Miller and Donders (2001) found that 50 percent of individuals
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with mild traumatic brain injury who were also involved in litigation or had filed for 
complete permanent disability had elevated FBS scores, while Martens et al. found that 
22 percent of these individuals had elevated scores on this scale. Taken together, the 
present research found greater specificity with regard to traumatic brain injury 
classifications and lower sensitivity with regard to the classification of malingering than 
prior research has indicated. Unfortunately, these studies did not consider individuals 
with somatoform disorders.
Ross et al. (2004) examined the Fake Bad Scale with regard to its ability to detect 
somatoform disorders and found that this particular scale may, in fact, be more successful 
at detecting invalid response sets than somatoform disorders. This is consistent with the 
current findings, which indicated that the Fake Bad Scale falsely classified individuals 
with somatoform disorders approximately 50 percent of the time.
The next hypothesis of the present research was based upon the fact that existing 
research had previously examined other MMPI-2 validity scales with regard to their 
utility in the detection of feigning symptoms, including the faking of head injury 
symptoms. This research indicated that several MMPI-2 validity scales, including the F 
Scale, the F-K Index, and the F(b) Scale were sensitive to overreporting of symptoms 
(e.g.. Butcher, Arbisi, Atlis, & McNulty, 2003; Greiffenstein et al., 2004; Larrabee, 1998; 
Berry & Butcher, 1998). It was, therefore, thought appropriate to discern the relative 
efficacy of these validity scales vis a vis the Fake Bad Scale by assessing how well each 
scale differentiated between malingerers and other diagnostic groups.
Specifically, the second hypothesis of this study was that the Fake Bad Scale 
would be comparable to the MMPI-2 F Scale, MMPI-2 F-K Index, and MMPI-2 F(b)
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Scale in terms of differentiating between individuals who are malingering and those with 
a traumatic brain injury as well as between those who have a somatoform disorder and 
those with a traumatic brain injury but would be less successful than the other MMPI-2 
validity scales when differentiating between individuals who are malingering and those 
with a somatoform disorder.
The data obtained indicated that each of the MMPI-2 validity scales, including the 
Fake Bad Scale, successfully differentiated among the three groups of interest. When 
individual pairwise comparisons were considered, the data demonstrated that all o f the 
MMPI-2 validity scales successfully differentiated between individuals who were 
malingering and those with a somatoform disorder as well as between those who were 
malingering and individuals with a traumatic brain injury. However, only the Fake Bad 
Scale also significantly differentiated between individuals who had a diagnosed 
somatoform disorder and individuals who had incurred a traumatic brain injury. This 
indicated that the Fake Bad Scale, as opposed to the F Scale, the F-K Index, and the F(b) 
Scale would be the scale of choice when differentiating between individuals previously 
diagnosed with a somatoform disorder and those who had incurred a traumatic brain 
injury.
However, as noted above when the sensitivity and specificity for each MMPI-2 
validity scale was considered, the Fake Bad Scale demonstrated less utility in the 
differential diagnosis of malingering and somatoform disorders. These findings are 
inconsistent with prior research by Dearth et al. (2004), which found that most of the 
MMPI-2 validity scales had perfect specificity rates but low to moderate sensitivity while 
the Fake Bad Scale had both moderate sensitivity and specificity. It is important to note.
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however, that Dearth et al. (2004) compared individuals with moderate to severe brain 
injuries to individuals who were either instructed to fake symptoms or to answer honestly 
in an analog setting. Thus, genuine malingerers were not included in this particular 
study.
Several other studies also compared various MMPI-2 validity scales to the Fake 
Bad Scale in terms of sensitivity and specificity. For example, Larrabee (1998) found the 
Fake Bad Scale to be superior to the F Scale in the detection o f malingered head injuries. 
Several other studies also found the Fake Bad Scale to be sensitive in this area (e.g., 
Larrabee, 2003a; Tsushima and Tsushima, 2001; Ross et al., 2004). Each of these studies 
found the Fake Bad Scale to be superior to other MMPI-2 validity scales in the detection 
of somatic malingering. These findings are quite consistent with the current research in 
that the Fake Bad Scale was found to have the greatest specificity in the detection of 
malingering.
However, the present research also examined the specificity of the MMPI-2 
validity scales with regard to somatoform disorder and traumatic brain injury 
classification. Prior research by Ross et al. (2004) found that the Fake Bad Scale may not 
be successful in the detection of somatoform disorders. The current research supported 
this finding based upon the Fake Bad Scale’s specificity in the detection of somatoform 
disorders. With regard to the other MMPI-2 validity scales that were considered, there 
was, in general, variability in the sensitivity and specificity. For example, the F-K Index 
exhibited extremely low sensitivity but very high specificity for both somatoform 
disorders and traumatic brain injuries while the F(b) Scale was more consistent in terms 
of moderate sensitivity and specificity across the diagnostic groups.
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Taken together, these data indicated that no one MMPI-2 validity scale perfectly 
predicted diagnostic group membership; rather, each appears to have strengths and 
weaknesses in this arena. In general, the F(b) Scale appeared to be the most consistent in 
its differential diagnosis across the three groups of interest. However, these findings 
indicate that, clinically, it is important not to base a diagnostic decision on any one 
measure. Additionally, these findings are inconsistent with prior research that suggested 
that the F Scale had the greatest sensitivity in detecting overreporting of symptoms, 
followed by the F-K Index and the F(b) Scale in that order (Ben-Porath, Graham, Hall, 
Hirschman, & Zaragoza, 1995).
As far as the present attempt to compare the Fake Bad Scale of the MMPI-2 to the 
Test of Memory Malingering (Tombaugh, 2002) and to the Portland Digit Recognition 
Test (Binder, 1993) there were insufficient numbers of participants who were actually 
administered these measures to allow meaningful comparisons. In future research it 
would be useful to pursue a comparison of the FBS and these scales. However, these 
measures were not specifically designed to detect somatic malingering as the Fake Bad 
Scale was. Rather, these measures were designed to measure aspects of cognitive and 
memory malingering. Thus, these measures may not compare to the other MMPl-2 
validity scales in the same manner as the Fake Bad Scale.
Lastly, it was posited that there would not be gender differences in Fake Bad 
Scale scores among the three groups of interest. The data did, in fact, bear this 
hypothesis out. This was expected due to the fact that the cutoff scores for this measure 
are gender based (Lees-Haley, 1992; Larrabee, 1998).
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Limitations of the Present Study 
The present study produced mixed results in support of the Fake Bad Scale’s 
utility in the detection of malingering in that it did produce significantly different mean 
scores for each of the three groups of interest as well as the highest rate of sensitivity and 
specificity for traumatic brain injuries, but it’s specificity with regard to somatoform 
disorders was well below that of other MMPI-2 validity scales. Thus, there should be 
significant clinical caution in the use of the Fake Bad Scale in the differential diagnosis 
of malingering and somatoform disorders. In general, the F(b) Scale of the MMPI-2 may 
be more consistent in its utility in this setting as its sensitivity was similar to the Fake 
Bad Scale and it had higher specificity in terms of somatoform disorders.
It should be noted that the strength of the above conclusions is mitigated 
somewhat since there were multiple limitations to the present study. The primary 
limitation was that, due to the archival nature of the data, it was impossible to control for 
which measures were administered to the participants, which resulted in some measures 
having too small of a sample size to report meaningful statistics. Additionally, some 
records were missing minor pieces of information that were critical to their being 
included in the study. For example, not every record had the participant’s MMPI-2 
answer form, which is required for calculating the Fake Bad Scale score. Thus, these 
participants had to be excluded fi*om the study reducing the overall sample size.
Another limitation was that the diagnoses were made by only one rater. Although 
the clinician who made the diagnoses utilized accepted diagnostic criteria (e.g., DSM-IV; 
Slick et al. criteria, 1999), it would still be more desirable to have multiple raters examine 
the same data in order to establish interrater reliability.
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Lastly, many participants had been assigned multiple diagnoses. For example, it 
was possible for participants to be assigned a diagnosis of a somatoform disorder while 
also being diagnosed with malingering of a cognitive deficit. These participants could 
have fallen into Slick et al’s (1999) categories of Probable or Possible Malingering. 
Ftowever, the present research only considered individuals with a pure diagnosis of 
malingering, somatoform disorder, or traumatic brain injury.
The limitations of this study certainly pave the way for future research to be 
conducted in this area. It would be of particular interest to establish interrater reliability 
for the participants’ diagnoses. Additionally, one could conduct this study over a period 
of time sufficient to allow for administration of selected measures to ensure that each 
participant was administered each measure of interest as well as the same form of each 
measure. However, this would be quite time consuming, and perhaps even impractical, 
as it could take many years to diagnose a sufficient number of individuals in each of the 
three categories. Another area of future research would be to include individuals with 
Probable or Possible Malingering (Slick et al, 1999), or to include those with multiple 
overlapping diagnoses of interest, to determine how the validity scales, and the FBS in 
particular, differentiate among these diagnoses.
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Gender: Male
Age: 22
Diagnosis: Somatoform Disorder
Tests Administered: Lateral Dominance Examination, Grip Strength Examination, 
Manual Finger Tapping Test, Grooved Pegboard Test, Trail Making Test Parts A & B, 
Reitan-Klove Sensory Perceptual Examination, Tactile Finger Recognition Test, 
Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised (Logical Memory Subtests I & II, Visual Reproduction 
Subtests I & II), Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised ( Abbreviated Battery), Wide 
Range Achievement Test-3, MMPI-2, MCMI-III, Bender Gestalt Visual-Motor Test, 
Clinical Interview
Background Information: An object the size of a small forklift fell onto subjects head 
in occipital area. Mental status alert and oriented. Possible fractures of cervical and 
thoracic spine. Laceration to scalp in occipital area (3 cm on left parietal region). 
Glasgow Coma Scale =15. No loss of consciousness in accident. X-Rays showed a 
“gaping at approximately C6 on the left with a questionable facet fracture or locked facet 
on the right.. .Computerized tomography.. . [revealed] a facet fracture on the right, 
possible ligamentous injury on the left at the level of C6.” All other x-rays normal. 
Neurological examination showed “motor and sensory present in all four extremities; 
however, he did complain of pain radiating down to the chest and down between his 
scapulae.”
Patient Interview: Trouble reading, speech difficulties in elementary school. Some 
experimentation with drugs as a teen, but denies using drugs currently or having 
difficulties with alcohol. Asthma as a child. Paranoid thoughts and one-time psychotic 
symptom (hearing voice of uncle). Post-accident symptoms: neck pain, back pain, 
wearing a soft collar, numbness in right side of body, headaches, significant sleep 
disturbance, sharp or throbbing pain in neck and back, depressed, ruminations about 
unfairness of work situation, anxiety about going to work, suicidal thoughts.
Test Results: Tests from Halstead-Reitan Battery scored using Heaton, Grant, & 
Matthews Comprehensive Norms for an Expanded Halstead-Reitan Batterv (199IT
SUBTEST
Grip Strength 
Right 
Left
RAW SCORE
23.5 kg
25.5 kg
T SCORE IMPAIRMENT
13 Severe 
23 Moderate to Severe
Finger-Tapping Test 
Right 
Left
51 taps 
49.5 taps
44 Below Avg./Normal 
51 Average
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Grooved Pegboard
Right 65 sec. 47 Average
Left 67 sec. 46 Average
Trail Making Test
Part A 33 sec. 39 Mild
Part B 74 sec. 44 Below Avg./Normal
WECHSLER ADULT INTELLIGENCE SCALE REVISED
SUBTEST AGE COHORT SCALED SCORE A C %ILE
Information 8 25
Digit Span 8 25
Arithmetic 6 9
Similarities 9 37
Picture Completion 10 50
Block Design 8 25
Digit Symbol 6 9
Prorated Verbal IQ = 88 (low average)
Prorated Performance IQ = 86 (low average)
Prorated Full Scale IQ = 86 (low average)
WECHSLER MEMORY SCALE -  REVISED
SUBTEST PERCENTILE
Logical Memory I 34
Logical Memory II 53
Visual Reproduction I 86
Visual Reproduction II 93
MINNESOTA MULTIPHASIC PERSONALITY INVENTORY -2
Welsh Code New 8**27i6*340” ’+9-5/F***’” +L/:K#
Fake Bad Scale Score = 30 (Above Cut-Off Score for Malingering)
F = 23 (T =  107)
F-K =14 (Raw)
F(b) = 12 (T = 92)
WIDE RANGE ACHIEVEMENT TEST -3
SUBTEST STANDARD SCORE %ILE GRADE
Reading 84 14 7
Spelling 75 5 5
Arithmetic 82 12 6
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MILLON CLINICAL MULTIAXIAL INVENTORY -  III
SCALE
Schizoid 
Avoidant 
Depressive 
Negativistic 
Masochistic 
Anxiety Disorder 
Somatoform Disorder 
Dysthymic Disorder 
Major Depression
DIAGNOSTIC IMPRESSIONS; (DSM-IV)
BASE RATE
79
78
77
82
75
88
95
82
75
AXIS I: (296.23) MAJOR DEPRESSIVE DISORDER, SINGLE EPISODE,
SEVERE WITHOUT PSYCHOTIC FEATURES 
(307.89) PAIN DISORDER ASSOCIATED WITH BOTH
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS AND A GENERAL 
MEDICAL CONDITION 
(316.0) PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS (PERSONALITY
TRAITS AND COPING STYLE) AFFECTING 
MEDICAL CONDITION 
(315) READING AND SPELLING DISORDERS (PRE­
EXISTING)
AXIS II: AVOIDANT, PARANOID, AND PASSIVE/AGGRESSIVE FEATURES
(PREEXISTING)
AXIS III: PER PHYSICIANS
AXIS IV: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL STRESSORS: WORK-
RELATED STRESS AND MARITAL STRESS
AXIS V: GLOBAL ASSESSMENT OF FUNCTIONING: MODERATE
SYMPTOMS
Accident did not cause abnormal brain functioning according to medical records, no 
neuropsychological dysfunction, placed enough stress on already weak personality 
structure to cause a major depressive episode and a pain disorder, his experience of pain 
is greater than objective symptoms would suggest
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Gender: Female
Age: 71
Diagnosis: Malingering
Tests Administered: Record Review, Clinical Interview of Patient and 
Collateral, Portland Digit Recognition Test, Seashore Rhythm Test, Speech 
Sounds Perception Test, Reitan-KIove Sensory Perceptual Examination, Tactile 
Finger Recognition Test, Finger-Tip Number Writing Perception Test, Tactile 
Form Recognition Test, Tactual Performance Test, Grip Strength Examination, 
Manual Finger Tapping Test, Grooved Pegboard Test, Bender Visual-Motor 
Gestalt: 5-Second Delay, Copy, and 30-Minute Delay Components, Trails A & B, 
Short Category Test Booklet Format, WMS-R, WAIS-R, WRAT-3, MCMI-II, 
MMPI-2, BAI, BDI
Background Information: Prior history of heart problems; has a pacemaker. 
Incident in question involved patient being “shocked” by a videogame machine. 
Patient reported being shocked in the right hand and feeling it go into her 
pacemaker. Had an episode of “violent shaking” and went unconscious. Later 
regained consciousness. Hospital reports indicated that patient had spilled liquid 
while playing the videogame machine. ER diagnosis = pacemaker malfunction, 
rule out myocardial infarct. No entrance or exit wound from electric shock 
present. Reports indicate that patient “fell about two feet off the ground [after 
shock] and later went into ventricular fibrillation.” One doctor noted that she is 
“confused all the time with a lack of concentration and forgetfulness.” Patient 
reported “it is as if there is pressure all over the head and into the ears, and this is 
constant all the time.”
One doctor reported that it was difficult for patient to recall her home address, she 
did not know her date of birth, her telephone number, or zip code, she could only 
remember the most recent two presidents, could only remember the month due to 
a holiday, knew the year but could not recall the day or date. Patient could not 
recall important historical facts (i.e., Kennedy’s assassination. Pearl Harbor) and 
could not subtract 7 from 100. Diagnosis = “Post-electrical shock with 
impairment of memory and confusion, etiology to be discussed.” Suggested CT 
Scan to rule out subdural hematoma.
Patient Interview: Patient unable to or was purposely not answering very simple 
questions concerning personal information, so clinician’s ability to gather a valid 
and reliable developmental, educational, and family history was affected. Patient 
could not state her correct age. Patient reported that she has had a profound 
memory loss since the accident. Patient very clearly remembered the day of the 
accident, including nearly every activity she engaged in on that day in a very 
specific manner. Patient also had slip-ups in her description of her problems, 
which she would try to cover in up in a very unsophisticated manner (e.g., “I
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remember.. .well, I don’t really remember but so many people have told me that I 
did [whatever activity she was discussing].”).
An interview with a collateral source that is very close to the patient was also 
conducted. He stated that the patient’s biggest problem since the accident is “loss 
of memory”, which he described as “She cannot remember certain things of the 
past and other things she can remember.” Stated that these problems began right 
after the accident. Also stated that the memory disturbance has been gradually 
getting worse since the accident. Other complaints: no longer spells as well, lost a 
lot of hair, bowel obstructions, further heart problems, cataracts, collapsing veins 
all over patient’s body.
Test Results:
HALSTEAD-REITAN TEST BATTERY
TEST RAW SCORE T SCORE IMPAIRMENT
RATING
TFR-R 18.27 sec. 43 Below Avg.
TFR-L 31.08 sec. 26 Moderate
TPT-R 8 min. 48 sec. 49 Average
TPT-L 18 min. 5 sec. 40 Below Avg.
TPT-B 6 min. 6 sec. 47 Average
TPT-Tot. Time 32 min. 59 sec. 43 Below Avg.
TPT-Mem. 4 39 Mild
TPT- Local. I 48 Average
G rip -R 27.5 kg. 55 Above Avg.
G rip -L 16 kg. 40 Below Avg.
T a p -R 40.8 taps 48 Average
T a p -L 26 taps 30 Mild to Mod.
P e g -R 86 sec. 42 Below Avg.
P e g -L 180 sec. 24 Mod. to
Severe
Trails A 26 sec. 63 Above Avg.
Trails B 374 sec. 24 Mod. to
Severe
S. Rhythm 24 Correct 48 Average
SSPT 8 errors 44 Below Avg.
Category 102 errors 38 Mild
Halstead Impair 1.0 25 Moderate
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WAIS-R
SUBTEST AGE CORRECTED SCALED 
CORR.%ILE
AGE
Information 8 25
Digit Span 8 25
Vocabulary 10 50
Arithmetic 7 16
Comprehension 9 37
Similarities 12 75
Picture Completion 8 25
Picture Arrangement 9 37
Block Design 13 84
Object Assembly 9 37
Digit Symbol 11 63
Verbal IQ 93 32
Performance IQ 97 42
Full Scale IQ 93
WMS-R
32
INDEX STANDARD SCORE %ILE
Verbal Mem. 81 10
Visual Mem. 122 93
General Mem. 96 39
Attention/ Concentration 87 19
Delayed Recall 103 58
PORTLAND DIGIT RECOGNITION TESTU
Easy Correct =14 (Below cut-off of 19)
Hard Correct =13 (Below cut-off of 18) 
Total Correct = 27 (Below cut-off of 39) 
♦♦Present performance falls below 1®‘ percentile^^
WRAT-3
SUBTEST
GRADE
Reading
Spelling
Arithmetic
INVALID
RAW
42
36
INVALID
STANDARD
96
94
INVALID
%ILE
39
34
INVALID
HS
7
BECK ANXIETY INVENTORY ; Raw Score = 8, within normal limits
III
BECK DEPRESSION INVENTORY; Raw Score = 16; Mild subjective 
depressive symptoms.
MMPI-2
Fake Bad Scale = 25
F = 55
K = 65
F-K = -10
F(b) = 46
Code Type = 3-0
o Very rare code type; usually describe self as very conventional and 
law-abiding; few, vague physical ailments; fearful and frequently 
phobic; unlikely to be psychotic
DIAGNOSTIC IMPRESSIONS: (DSM-IV)
AXIS I: V65.2 MALINGERING (OF CURRENT MEMORY
DISTURBANCE)
293.89 ANXIETY D /0 DUE TO MULT. MED. COND.
293.83 MOOD D/O W/DEP. FEAT. DUE TO MULT.
MED.
COND.
316 PSYCHOLOGICAL SYMPT. AFFECTING
MULT.
MED. COND.
293.0 DELIRIUM DUE TO ACUTE CARDIAC
ABNORMALITY, RESOLVED
AXIS II: HISTRIONIC PERSONALITY FEATURES
AXIS III: SEVERAL PRE- AND POST-ACCIDENT PHYSICAL
PROBLEMS
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS PRE-ACCIDENT:
• MENTAL REACTION TO A RASH OUT OF 
PROPORTION TO SYMPTOMS
• VALIUM PRESCRIPTION ACCOMPANIED BY 
CHEST PAIN
• PATIENT EXTREMELY NERVOUS; GIVEN 
VALIUM
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS POST-ACCIDENT:
• CONFUSION, EVEN ON VERY BASIC INFO., 
LACK OF CONCENTRATION
• “POSSIBILITY OF FUNCTIONAL OVERLAY”
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• CHEST PAIN, UNUSUAL, DON’T MATCH 
CLASSIC PATTERN EXPECTATION 
ANXIOUS, TEARFUL, DEMANDING 
SEVERE ANXIETY?
VIOLENT MOOD SWINGS 
HEADACHE, SHAKY, NERVOUS 
PROZAC FOR DEPRESSION 
“MULTIPLE PSYCHOSOMATIC SYMPTOMS, 
PERIODS OF DEPRESSION AND MOOD 
SWINGS
AXIS IV: PSYCHOSOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS: 
HEALTH
PROBLEMS IN FAMILY
AXIS V: GAF: 63
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